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Tutkimuksen tarkoitus 
Odotettujen synergioiden on usein esitetty motivoivan yrityksiä maksamaan korkeita preemioita 
yrityskaupoissa. Tutkimustulokset olemassa olevassa kirjallisuudessa aiheeseen liittyen ovat 
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uutta tietoa kolmea kanavaa pitkin. 1) kavennan näkökulmaa kaikkien synergioiden 
samanaikaisesta analysoinnista operatiivisien kulukarsinnan tuloksena syntyvien synergioiden 
tutkimiseen parantaakseni ymmärrystä premioiden syntyyn vaikuttavista yksityiskohtaisista 
tekijöistä. 2) tuon keskusteluun toimialojen väliset erot yristysten arvostuksessa yhtenä preemioita 
selittävänä tekijänä. 3) tutkin preemioiden aikasarjakäyttäytymistä ja sen käytöksen riippuvuutta 
odottetujen operatiivisten synergioden kanssa. Tämä analyysi toimii vastauksena viimeaikaisten 
tutkimusten esittämiin spekulatiivisiin arvioihin preemioiden aikariippuvuuden synnystä. 
Lähdeaineisto ja tutkimusmenetelmä 
Analyysi perustuu Mergermarket-tietokannan lähdeaineistoon, joka pitää sisällään 2082 
Euroopassa tehtyä julkisesti listatun yrityksen ostoa vuosien 2006 ja 2015 välillä. Tutkin 
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regressioanalyysillä. Analyysi pitää sisällään useamman regressiomallin, joissa lisättyjen selittävien 
muuttujien yhteistä merkitsevyyttä tutkitaan F-testeillä binääristen toimialaindikaattoreiden 
kanssa sekä ilman niitä. Preemoiden aikasarjakäyttäytymisen analysoinnin pohjana arvioin 
preemioiden kuukausittaisten keskiarvojen autokorrelaatiokertoimet sekä testaan näiden 
kertoimien tilastollista merkitsevyyttä. Näiden tulosten pohjalta arvioin autoregressiivisen 
liikkuvan keskiarvon mallin kahdelle ryhmällä, joita erottaa odotettujen operatiivisten synergioiden 
oletettu olemassaolo. Tämän tarkoitus on paljastaa, ohjaavatko odotetut operatiiviset synergiat 
yrityskaupoissa maksettujen preemioiden suuruutta yli ajan. 
Tulokset 
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suuruudesta. Preemiot ovat merkitsevästi erisuuruisia eri toimialoilla. Odotettujen operatiivisten 
synergioiden vaikutus preemioiden suuruuteen eroaa merkitsevästi eri toimialojen välillä, mutta 
yksittäisiä toimialoja, joilla vaikutus olisi merkitsevästi suurempi, ei havaita aineiston pohjalta. 
Preemioiden havaitaan olevan riippuvia viimeaikaisten preemioiden suuruudesta. Tämä tulos on 
yhdenmukainen viimeaikaisen tutkimusaineiston kanssa. Lisäksi havaitsen, että viimeaikaisten 
valuaatiotasojen vaikutus tämänhetkisiin preemioihin on merkitsevä viiden kuukauden ajalta. 
Preemioiden aikasarjakäyttäytymisessä ei havaita eroavaisuuksia yrityskaupoissa, joissa oletetaan 
olevan odotettuja operatiivisia synergioita.  
Avainsanat  yrityskaupat, preemio, synergia, momentum 
1 
 
 
 
Contents 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 4 
1.1 Research problem and purpose ......................................................................................... 6 
1.2 Contribution to existing literature..................................................................................... 8 
1.3 Main findings .................................................................................................................... 9 
1.4 Practical implications ..................................................................................................... 10 
1.5 Limitations of the study .................................................................................................. 10 
1.6 Suggestions for further research ..................................................................................... 11 
1.7 Structure.......................................................................................................................... 11 
2 Theoretical background and literature review ....................................................................... 12 
2.1 Takeover premiums ........................................................................................................ 12 
2.1.1 Target characteristics ............................................................................................... 12 
2.1.2 Buyer characteristics ................................................................................................ 15 
2.1.3 Market factors .......................................................................................................... 17 
2.2 Synergies ........................................................................................................................ 18 
3 Hypotheses development ....................................................................................................... 20 
4 Data and variables ................................................................................................................. 24 
4.1 Data sample .................................................................................................................... 24 
4.2 Variables ......................................................................................................................... 24 
4.2.1 Takeover premiums ................................................................................................. 24 
4.2.2 Industry classification & existence of expected operational synergies ................... 25 
4.2.3 Deal characteristics .................................................................................................. 26 
4.2.4 Business cycle .......................................................................................................... 27 
5 Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 27 
5.1 Takeover premiums and expected operational synergies (H1) ...................................... 27 
5.2 Interindustry differences ................................................................................................. 28 
5.2.1 Simple industry differences (H2.1) .......................................................................... 28 
2 
 
 
 
5.2.2 Industry-differences and expected operational synergies (H2.2) ............................ 30 
5.3 Momentum effect ........................................................................................................... 31 
5.3.1 Overall momentum effect (H3.1) ............................................................................. 31 
5.3.2 Momentum and expected operational synergies (H3.2) .......................................... 32 
6 Results ................................................................................................................................... 36 
6.1 Takeover premiums and expected operational synergies ............................................... 39 
6.1.1 Discussion: Takeover premiums and expected operational synergies ..................... 41 
6.2 Interindustry differences ................................................................................................. 42 
6.2.1 Simple industry differences ..................................................................................... 42 
6.2.2 Industry-differences and expected operational synergies ........................................ 44 
6.2.3 Discussion: Interindustry differences ...................................................................... 46 
6.3 Momentum...................................................................................................................... 47 
6.3.1 Overall momentum effect ........................................................................................ 47 
6.3.2 Momentum and expected operational synergies ...................................................... 49 
6.3.3 Discussion: Momentum ........................................................................................... 52 
7 Robustness tests ..................................................................................................................... 54 
7.1 Homoscedasticity............................................................................................................ 55 
7.2 Linearity.......................................................................................................................... 58 
7.3 Normality ........................................................................................................................ 62 
8 Summary and conclusions ..................................................................................................... 64 
References ................................................................................................................................ 68 
 
 
  
3 
 
 
 
List of tables 
Table 1: Industry classification ................................................................................................ 25 
Table 2: Summary sample statistics ......................................................................................... 37 
Table 3: Variable pairwise correlations ................................................................................... 38 
Table 4: Results for cross-sectional regression model (1) ....................................................... 40 
Table 5: Results for cross-sectional regression model (2) ....................................................... 42 
Table 6: Results for cross-sectional regression model (3) ....................................................... 44 
Table 7: Results for test regression of Breusch-Godfrey test for 20:th order autocorrelation . 47 
Table 8: Autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation of monthly premium averages .............. 49 
Table 9: Estimated ARMA(5,5) model for pooled monthly premium averages ...................... 50 
Table 10: Results for Chow's test for parameter stability between ARMA(5,5) models with and 
without expected operational synergies ................................................................................... 51 
Table 11: Results for Z-tests for differences in individual coefficients between ARMA(5,5) 
models with and without expected operational synergies ........................................................ 52 
Table 12: Results for test regression of White's test for heteroscedasticity in model (1) ........ 56 
Table 13: Results for test regression of White's test for heteroscedasticity in model (2) ........ 57 
Table 14: Results for test regression of Ramsey's RESET test for prediction power of nonlinear 
combinations of explanatory variables in model (1) ................................................................ 60 
Table 15: Results for test regression of Ramsey's RESET test for prediction power of nonlinear 
combinations of explanatory variables in model (2) ................................................................ 61 
Table 16: Results for Jarque-Bera test for residual distribution in model (1) .......................... 63 
Table 17: Results for Jarque-Bera test for residual distribution in model (2) .......................... 64 
 
List of figures 
Figure 1: Time-series of monthly premium averages .............................................................. 54 
Figure 2: Time-series of quarterly premium averages ............................................................. 54 
  
4 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
To initiate a public takeover, the acquiring company makes a bid for the target company’s assets 
(i.e. asset sale) or its equity base (i.e. stock sale). In successful acquisitions, the bid is usually 
valued at a premium relative to the target’s estimated fair value on standalone premises. While 
some mergers and acquisitions are motivated by dubious reasons, such as agency motives and 
managerial hubris, the economic argument for undertaking an acquisition valued at a premium 
relates to potential synergies associated with the transaction (see e.g. Berkovitch and 
Narayanan, 1993; and Damodaran 2005). 
If merging two companies together creates synergistic value, the incremental value-add is 
possible to split between the acquirer and target company shareholders so that all involved 
parties gain. For the acquiring company shareholders, the gain is incorporated in long-term 
share price development, whereas for the target company shareholders, the gain materializes in 
the form of acquisition premium paid by the acquirer as the deal closes. 
With regards to the size of the premium, conventional wisdom mostly speaks to correlative 
relation between the premiums and the amount of synergies that the acquiring company’s 
management expects to achieve by merging the two companies together. This precept is not 
without academic support. Bradley et al. (1988) find that acquisitions, on average, increase the 
total value of the acquiring company and the target by 7.4%. Also, Gupta and Gerchak (2002) 
propose that the bid price premium relative to the target’s prevailing pre-announcement stock 
price can be justified by operational synergies. Interestingly, Gupta and Gerchak also base the 
analysis on an assumption that the acquirer makes long-term use of the target company’s entire 
capacity. In other words, they only account for revenue side synergies, while the value created 
by cost reduction is excluded from the analysis altogether. They do this despite that cost 
synergies in particular are conventionally considered as the most value-creative of the two. The 
implication is that Gupta’s and Gerchak’s (2002) valuation serves as a mere lower bound to the 
actual value created through the acquisition. 
Revenue synergies have been a subject to considerable critique. This tends to be true especially 
outside the academic research domain. The controversiality with regards to revenue synergies 
emerges from the difficulty to measure and capture them. While admittedly in some cases 
revenue synergies can be truly value-creative, they are likely to be overestimated by the 
management or do not realize at all (see e.g. Ficery et al., 2007). Christofferson et al. (2004) 
also find consistent results in a McKinsey study, presenting that in less than 17% of acquisitions 
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promised revenue side synergies are ultimately delivered fully, while cost side synergy targets 
are met in 35% of all acquisitions, i.e. in more than double of all transactions as opposed to 
revenue synergies. 
While cost synergies have been less criticized and are arguably easier to both capture and 
measure, they too are challenged by some researchers. E.g., Slusky and Caves (1991) find no 
evidence of connection between real synergies and acquisition bid prices whatsoever, either on 
cost or revenue side, but conclude that other factors than operational synergies drive the price 
paid in acquisitions. These factors vary from financial synergies and arbitrage between real and 
financial assets to managerial behavior, and competitive environment1. 
Conclusively, it remains debatable if acquisition synergies in most corporate mergers even 
exist. Nonetheless, many acquiring companies announce certain synergy targets or estimates 
together with deal announcements. Given that fewer synergies tend to materialize than what the 
management projects (see e.g. Ficery et al., 2007), the announced level of synergies, on average, 
is overestimated.  
At least two identifiable reasons exist for the overrating of announced synergies. Firstly, the 
management might exhibit overconfident behavior and overestimate their ability to create 
synergies between the two companies. This explanation is consistent with the fact that many 
researchers have found significant evidence of managerial overconfidence in corporate 
investments (see e.g. Malmendier and Tate, 2005) as well as in acquisitions behavior 
specifically (see e.g. Malmendier and Tate, 2008). Hence, it is probable that at least some level 
of systematic miscalibration biases the managers’ estimates of synergies upwards. As a result, 
the announced synergies are overstated relative to the extent that they are most likely going to 
realize. This reasoning, nevertheless, implicitly subsumes an assumption that the managers 
intend to give unbiased estimates of the realizable synergies to the public, and therefore the 
communicated level of synergies converges with the managers’ sincere assessment. 
The second possible reason is that regardless of the accuracy of the management estimates, the 
managers might intentionally communicate an overestimated level of synergies to the public. 
This behavior would better enable the management to “sell” the deal to the public, principally 
                                                 
1 With ‘financial synergies’, Slusky and Caves (1991) refer to exploiting the discrepancy between the acquirer’s 
and the target company’s financial stringency; If there is a difference between the two companies’ internal funds’ 
opportunity cost, and considerable transaction costs are associated with external financing, an acquisition could be 
value-creative to the extent of the decrease in external financing costs net of transaction costs associated with the 
acquisition itself. 
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to the shareholders of the acquiring company, to get the transaction carried out regardless of 
whether the acquisition in fact is expected to create shareholder value. If the management can 
stir up a public sense of high synergies associated with the merger, a higher acquisition premium 
is mentally justified and accepted by the shareholders, and the deal is more likely going to close 
successfully. Alike managerial behavior might be induced by private benefits arising from 
excessive M&A activity, or empire building (see e.g. Trautwein, 1990; Holl and Kyriazis, 
1997). It is noteworthy that the abovementioned vehicles via which the announced synergies 
are overestimated can be alternative or, perhaps more likely, affecting jointly. 
 
1.1 Research problem and purpose 
Whether the publicly announced synergy targets are unintentionally overestimated or 
intentionally overstated, one would intuitively expect that higher premiums generally follow 
high expected synergies. In the extant research, however, there is a distinct dissonance on 
whether this holds true empirically. 
Advocates of the causal relation between takeover premiums and synergies include e.g. 
Lambrecht (2004) who proposes that cumulative post-announcement returns for the acquirer 
and the target company are determined by three factors, namely synergies, size and hysteresis. 
Also, Gupta and Gerchak (2002) find a significant coefficient for operational synergies when 
tested on the premiums. While empirical evidence suggests that acquirers, on average, produce 
zero or negative abnormal returns at the deal announcement (see e.g. Fuller et al., 2002), 
Bradley et al. (1988) find that acquisitions, on average, have an increasing effect to the 
combined value of acquirer and the target company equity. They also find that the increase in 
the combined equity value is independent on the allocation of value between the buyer and the 
seller. This result implies that the size of the premium paid to the target company shareholders 
in an acquisition negatively contributes to the announcement return for the bidding company’s 
share price. 
Perhaps the most influential piece of research on the opposing side of studies on the synergy 
effect is that of Slusky’s and Caves’ (1991), who conclude that synergistic variables are unable 
to explain acquisition premiums. Following in their footsteps, many researchers in subsequent 
studies have even considered the size of the premium as an approximation for the degree of 
adverse quality in the managerial decision making (Laamanen, 2007). Consistently with Slusky 
and Caves (1991), Gondhalekar et al. (2004) present evidence that synergies do not significantly 
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affect takeover premiums. Instead, they find that the bid pricing is rather driven by managerial 
agency.  
Given the differing views in the existing research on whether the level of takeover premiums 
follow the existence of expected synergies, a more detailed review on the topic is called for. 
For this reason, in this paper, I intend to provide new information about the relationship between 
takeover premiums and expected synergies by decomposing the possible interdependency with 
statistical tools which are, to a large extent, novel to this research area. 
The analysis is three-fold. First, the connection between takeover premiums and synergies is 
analyzed in a simple empirical setting to determine whether expected synergies drive premiums 
paid in corporate mergers and acquisitions. Secondly, I proceed to study whether differences 
between industries can provide new information about the aforementioned relationship, which 
is largely an undocumented area in this field of research to date. Lastly, I validate the previous 
results by comparing average premiums in different points in time separately for acquisitions 
with and without assumed synergies. The analysis of the relationship between premiums and 
synergies from this complementary standpoint is intended to provide new evidence on whether 
changing levels of synergies drive the premiums in time. 
Measures used to approximate synergistic value vary in prior research. Early studies mostly 
develop simple measures of relatedness between the acquirer and the target company 
businesses. For instance, Rumelt (1974) calculates the relatedness of two companies by 
observing the policies used to integrate its assorted businesses. Similar measures were also used 
in a more statistics-oriented study by Lemelin (1982). Caves (1975) uses the standard industry 
classification (SIC). In a subsequent study, Slusky and Caves (1991) develop Caves’ earlier 
measure to account for the portion of acquirer’s and the target’s sales that are deemed to have 
potential for synergistic gains. Some of the more recent pieces of research have pursued more 
complex approaches to capture the synergies’ effect on takeover premiums. For example, 
Lambrecht (2004) derives a computational variable for the incremental output of the merged 
entity relative to the two standalone companies’ combined output prior to the merger. Gupta 
and Gerchak (2002), on the other hand, present a relatively complicated real option model for 
synergies. 
While different measures for synergistic value have been proposed, constructing an all-
encompassing approximation for synergy has proven to be a difficult task due to the synergies’ 
intrinsically abstract nature. Perhaps a more fruitful approach to the issue would be to focus in 
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one type of synergistic value at a time, which enables the researcher to develop an appropriate 
measure for the particular concept under primary interest. With regards to the extant research 
on the topic, synergy measures that are drawn from the relatedness of the acquirer and target 
company industries (see e.g. Rumelt, 1974; Caves, 1975; Slusky and Caves, 1991) better 
capture the cost-reduction potential for the combined entity, whereas computational variables 
for incremental output (see e.g. Lambrecht, 2004) tend to focus in revenue side synergies. 
Taking into account that revenue synergies are conventionally considered as less value-adding 
relative to cost-reduction potential (see e.g. Ficery et al., 2007), I choose to adopt the former 
methodological approach. 
Consequently, the results of this study are primarily applicable to the extent that expected 
synergies are interpreted as potential for cost-reduction and other ways of operational 
streamlining expected to result in incremental combined equity value between the two 
companies, i.e. operational synergies. 
 
1.2 Contribution to existing literature 
Although the extant research is not altogether unfamiliar with the connection between takeover 
premiums and synergy, the results have been somewhat inconsistent with each other. As has 
been covered in ‘1.1 Research problem and purpose’ section of this paper, it is possible that the 
inconsistency stems partly from ambiguous definitions for synergy and differing measures 
employed to approximate synergistic value expected to be created in a transaction. Therefore, 
this study aims to provide new information about the topic by decomposing the concept of 
synergy and focusing in only source of synergistic value-add, operational synergies. This 
approach has been chosen particularly for the fact that operational cost-side synergies are found 
to be more value-adding as opposed to other forms of synergistic value (see e.g. Ficery, 2007), 
together with the notion that cost-side synergies are more likely to arise when the buyer and the 
seller companies are convergent in terms of their business models (see e.g. Slusky and Caves, 
1991). 
While the early literature on the topic mainly adopted a likewise methodological approach (see 
e.g. Rumelt, 1974; Caves, 1975; Slusky and Caves, 1991), there are no in-date studies available 
in which the relation would be analyzed comprehensively before this paper, to the extent of my 
knowledge. Moreover, the existing studies are often limited in their sample sizes and 
geographically focus in one country at a time, particularly the United States, whereas an 
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analysis of the European takeover market enables to cover any possible differences between 
domestic and cross-border transactions. 
In addition, the extent to which the merging companies can materialize synergies is dependent 
on the industry they are operating in. Nevertheless, the existing literature mostly disregards any 
possible interindustry differences in the relationship between premiums and synergies. 
Therefore, in this study, I cut into the industry differences to provide novel information about 
the determinants of the takeover premiums. 
Most studies on the topic of premiums and synergies base their conclusions on simple 
regression analyses without considering any possible variations in the effect in time. 
Interestingly, another line of financial research has documented a time-dependency in the 
premiums alone (see e.g. Simonyan, 2014). Furthermore, it has been proposed that this time-
behavior is possibly driven by changing levels expected synergy common to all transactions 
(see Rosen, 2006). However, the connection between changing levels of premiums and 
synergies in time has not been empirically studied to date. For this reason, in this study, I 
position the latter part of this study in the intersection of the two lines of research and present 
new evidence on whether changing levels of synergy cyclically drive premiums in corporate 
takeovers. 
 
1.3 Main findings 
This study presents evidence that takeover premiums paid in corporate takeovers are generally 
independent on expected operational synergies. This result is consistent with those of Slusky 
and Caves (1991) and Gondhalekar et al. (2004). The level of takeover premiums is also found 
to display differences between industries. Moreover, the effect that expected operational 
synergies have on the premiums is found to differ between industries. However, individual 
industries where the effect would be particularly evident were not identified. 
Consistently with Simonyan (2014), takeover premiums are found to exhibit momentum. 
Significant dependency on recent history was observed up to five previous monthly periods. 
While Rosen (2006) proposes a possible explanation for the momentum in premiums that 
changing levels of expected synergy common to all acquisitions drive the general level of 
premiums in time, this study finds inconsistent results. Specifically, expected operational 
synergies are found to be unable to explain the dependency of periodic premium averages on 
recent historical periods. In light of these results, I propose that the cyclicality of takeover 
10 
 
 
 
premiums is driven by benchmarking in valuation processes which gives rise to temporal 
market conventions for a comparably attractive valuation level. Moreover, I expect that the 
changes in this convention is, to a large extent, random rather than possible to convincingly 
explain on rational basis. 
 
1.4 Practical implications 
The observed independency between takeover premiums and expected operational synergies 
challenges the conventional perception of how the target companies should be valued in 
corporate takeovers. The central question under interest is whether generous premiums are paid 
because the deals are likely to create synergistic value, or to ensure that transactions are 
successfully carried out, often driven by dubious motives. While the descriptive resolution for 
this question is interesting per se, it also lays the groundwork for a normative question of how 
much a potential acquirer should be willing to pay for a target company. 
While generous premiums are often justified by high expected synergies, the results of this 
study suggest that nonrational reasons come in to play when acquisitions are valued at high 
premiums. Therefore, investors should be on the alert for alike management pursuits to grow 
the company inorganically. 
In the academic research domain, some studies even regard premiums and expected synergies 
as explicit proxies to each other (see e.g. Madura and Ngo, 2008). Considering the results of 
this study, such presumption is not recommended. On the opposite side of the researcher 
spectrum, some studies use the premiums as a measure for the degree of adverse quality in the 
managerial decision making (Laamanen, 2007). While this approach is arguably preferred 
relative to the former, it is noteworthy that the results of this study alone do not provide evidence 
against all possible sources of synergistic gains in corporate acquisitions but focus in the 
operational domain of synergies, leaving e.g. financial arbitrage as a possible motivator to pay 
inflated premiums. 
 
1.5 Limitations of the study 
As has been pointed out, the amount of synergy expected to be created in a corporate merger is 
difficult to estimate for the synergies’ arbitrary nature. Therefore, the chosen methodology to 
measure synergies largely determines what type of synergies are tested and what portion of the 
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potential value-add is respectively disregarded, often unintentionally. In this study, I follow the 
example of e.g. Rumelt (1974), Caves (1975), and Slusky and Caves (1991) and derive the 
synergy measure from the similarity of the acquirer and target company industries, which in 
these studies has been recognized to correlate especially with cost-reduction potential in a given 
transaction.  
It is noteworthy that while this measure is not particularly accurate in estimating expected 
operational synergies for individual transactions, even a weak connection between cost-
reduction potential and the relatedness of the company industries constitutes solid large-sample 
properties that enable interpretation of the results of statistical analysis on aggregate level. Yet, 
other forms of expected synergistic value might come in to play in the valuation considerations 
when acquisitions are initiated. Therefore, the results of this study should be interpreted with a 
caveat when the bid price mostly bases on forms of expected value-add that do not characterize 
as cost-reduction potential or other ways of operational streamlining. A prime example of such 
expectation of incremental combined equity value between the two companies without expected 
operational synergies would be financial arbitrage and tax benefits that are undisputed and well 
documentable prior to the deal execution. 
 
1.6 Suggestions for further research 
A high number of significant determinants of acquisitions premiums has been presented in the 
financial literature to date. However, trends that drive the premiums in time are a much less-
studied topic. Given the cyclicality of both acquisition volumes and valuation levels, a 
recommended step for subsequent research would be to identify further causes for the time-
dependent behavior of premiums. Also, considering that the acquisition volumes and the 
premium levels are found to be inversely interrelated (see e.g. Simonyan, 2014; and Vanne, 
2015), studying the connection between the two would be an interesting extension to the field 
of research. 
 
1.7 Structure 
After the introductory part of section 1, this report is structured as follows. Section 2 
summarizes the existing literature on acquisition premiums and synergies. Tested hypotheses 
are developed in section 3. Data and variables, and methodology of this thesis are introduced 
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in sections 4 and 5, respectively. Results are presented in section 6, and their robustness tested 
in section 7. Lastly, section 8 summarizes and concludes the key takeaways of this paper. 
 
2 Theoretical background and literature review 
 
2.1 Takeover premiums 
In this section, I summarize factors that are found in existing research to have an effect to the 
level of takeover premiums. This examination is divided to three subcategories, namely target 
company characteristics, acquiring company characteristics, and market-related factors. While 
some of the presented evidence and research results fall clearly under merely one of the 
abovementioned rubrics, it is noteworthy that many studies combine features of two or all three 
of the covered categories. 
 
2.1.1 Target characteristics 
Intuitively, one would expect that factors which make a potential acquisition prospect attractive 
to a potential buyer have a positive effect to the offered bid price, and thus the premium. This 
result was empirically confirmed by early pieces of research on the topic already some thirty 
years ago (see e.g. Haw, 1987; Hay, 1989). A general tendency in more recent literature has 
been to further decompose the attractiveness of a potential takeover target. It is noteworthy that 
an attractive takeover target does not necessarily translate into ‘a good company’. This is 
because the attributes that generally make a good company, such as strong profitability and 
growth, positive prospects for future business development, nonvolatile cash flows etc., are 
typically already incorporated in the market value, that is, given that these attributes are known 
to the public. Therefore, motivation for the acquirer to pay a premium in addition to the pre-
acquisition price must stem from other sources of value. 
Two among the most frequently presented potential root causes for the willingness to pay a 
premium are information asymmetry and expected synergies between the acquiring company 
management and the public. Cai and Sevilir (2012) find that board connections between the 
acquirer and the target company increase the value creation and generally have a negative effect 
on the paid premium. The implication is that information asymmetries tend to drive managers 
into poor acquisition decisions, or at least to pay too generously for the takeover targets. In 
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addition, diminishing the asymmetry by establishing board connections also helps to estimate 
synergy potential between the companies. While the expected synergies are often considered 
as one among the most cardinal factors with regards to the size of takeover premiums (and are 
the central focus of this paper as well), I leave a more detailed inspection of existing research 
on synergies as a determinant of takeover premiums to subsequent sections in this paper. 
Other than synergies and information asymmetry, one of the most evident factors that has 
repeatedly been shown to affect the size of takeover premiums in the existing literature is the 
target company size. Alexandridis et al. (2013) document a robust negative relation between 
the target company size and the premium relative to the target’s pre-announcement market 
capitalization. Lambrecht (2004) uses a different measure for the target company size, and 
calculates a ratio of bidder size to target size. Likewise, this variable is found to have a 
significant negative effect on the takeover premiums, consistently with the abovementioned 
results. Due to the relatively high level of consent on the size effect in the extant research, target 
company size has been used as a control variable by exceptionally large portion of academic 
studies exploring the topic (De La Bruslerie, 2011). 
Ownership structure of the target company has several implications to its attractiveness from a 
potential acquirer’s perspective and to the price the acquirer needs to bid to succeed in the 
takeover attempt. Stulz (1988) presents evidence that the bargaining power of a large 
shareholder negatively relates to the size of the premium. Also, if large shareholders have 
established a shareholder agreement or other controlling devices, e.g. non-pro-rata voting rights 
or rights to cash distributions, the acquirer is forced to bid more aggressively, resulting in higher 
valuations, and thus higher premiums (Volpin, 2002; Belot, 2010). 
Similarly, private benefits enjoyed by one or more significant blockholders positively 
contribute to the size of takeover premiums. As private benefits make the company more 
valuable for the large shareholders but not to the public, i.e. the stock price generally does not 
reflect the private value, the acquirer must bid higher premiums to convince the incumbent 
owners to accept the acquisition offer. This view is theoretically supported by Bebchuk (1994), 
Burkard et al. (2000), and Burkart and Panunzi (2004). Moeller (2005) presents empirical 
evidence with consistent results. 
Financial leverage of the target company can also have an effect to the takeover premiums 
through the amount of private benefits (De La Bruslerie, 2011). The author argues that the effect 
is particularly pronounced for controlled companies of family-owned enterprises. If leverage 
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limits the amount of private benefits, premiums tend to be lower in case of highly levered 
companies. Alternatively, it is possible that high leverage enables the controlling shareholder 
to exert power in the company, thus amplifying their private benefits. Consequently, in order 
for the takeover to be successful the buyer must bid more generously, resulting in higher 
premiums (Stulz, 1988). Conclusively, it is undefined whether leverage overall has a significant 
effect to the takeover premiums, and if so, whether the effect is positive or negative. 
Changes in the level of regulation within a certain industry tend to trigger economic shocks that 
contribute in clustering of mergers and acquisitions activity within that industry (see e.g. 
Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; and Mulherin and Boone, 2000). Besides affecting the frequency 
of acquisitions carried out, the event can also have an impact to the size of an average premium 
paid in those transactions. Simonyan (2014) presents evidence that takeover premiums in 
industries that are under a relatively heavy regulatory burden are significantly lower in 
comparison to the average premiums within all industries. The author also documents that the 
premium discount tends to disappear concurrently with a deregulation event. Therefore, the 
average premium in the industry in post-deregulation state does not significantly differ from 
the market as a whole. 
While most of the abovementioned factors affect the subjective value of a potential acquisition 
target to the bidder, the premium is also affected by speculative movements in the target’s share 
price prior to the bid announcement. Because virtually all successful public takeovers are valued 
at a premium relative to the market’s consent on the target’s standalone value, i.e. the stock 
price, an anticipation that a given firm will eventually be acquired generally increases the firm’s 
market value. The higher is the perceived probability of being acquired and the shorter is the 
time period the acquisition is believed to happen, the stronger is the anticipation effect to the 
share price. Consistently with this reasoning, Crawford and Lechner (1996) present empirical 
evidence that an anticipation of a takeover has a positive effect to the company’s market value 
and thus negatively contributes to the size of the premium in the event that the acquisition 
materializes. 
Schwert (1996) studies the relation between public takeover premiums and the target 
company’s pre-announcement stock price movements. Specifically, the author identifies 
acquired companies that registered a notable runup in the share price prior to the acquisition 
announcement. The results show that the paid premium in relative terms and the pre-
announcement increase in the target’s stock price are generally uncorrelated. The implication 
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is that the bid price, on average, increases with a roughly linear slope relative to the pre-
announcement share price. Therefore, any positive movements in the stock’s market value prior 
to the announcement is an added cost to the bidder should the transaction eventually materialize. 
 
2.1.2 Buyer characteristics 
The buyer’s choice for the means of payment used in the transaction is a pivotal factor in many 
respects in the transaction process, and has been found to significantly affect the size of the 
average takeover premium. E.g. Cheng et al. (2008) find evidence that the form of consideration 
and the takeover premiums are significantly interdependent. Academics have mostly explained 
the observed relation with information asymmetry (see e.g. Eckbo et al, 1990). A risk-averse 
buyer with nonperfect information is factoring an information risk discount to the bid price, and 
hence is willing to pay a smaller premium. For the acquiring company, one way to alleviate the 
risk arising from the information asymmetry is to transfer part of the risk to the target company 
shareholders by offering shares of the newly merged company (instead of cash) as the medium 
of exchange.  
From the selling company shareholders’ point of view, accepting equity or other securities is 
justifiable if the bid price then is higher compared to a cash offer on the abovementioned 
premises. This view, however, is not supported by empirics. On the contrary, cash deals are 
found to result in significantly higher premiums, on average (see e.g. Cheng et al., 2008; Ayers, 
et al., 2003; Amihud et al., 1990; and Travlos, 1987). However, it is noteworthy that the 
information risk mitigating motives might carry less weight in the target company shareholders’ 
decision making relative to the upside of getting to share the value-add arising from expected 
synergies. 
Hansen (1987) was the first to introduce the concept of “double lemons effect”, which refers to 
the author’s observation that mergers often actualize in a state of bidirectional information 
asymmetry between the acquirer and the target company. Given that equity is used as the means 
of payment, not only does the acquirer not know the true value of the assets it is buying but also 
the seller does not know the true value of the shares it receives in the barter transaction. Contrary 
to the abovementioned risk mitigating benefit of exchanging securities instead of cash 
advocated by both the seller and the buyer, the selling company shareholders’ uncertainty with 
regards to the value of those securities discourages them to accept a use of noncash 
consideration, i.e. most often equity. 
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While the size of takeover premiums can be affected by mitigating the consequences of 
asymmetric information, an alternative medium to alleviate the issue would be mitigating the 
level of asymmetry itself. Chang and Mais (2000) present an idea that the state of considerable 
asymmetric information is less likely to arise when the buyer holds a large block of the target 
company’s shares already prior to the merger announcement. The degree of prior ownership, 
or what the authors call a “toehold”, is found to significantly reduce the asymmetry between 
the transaction parties. Further, the decrease in asymmetric information produces a significant 
discount in the takeover premiums. Transitively, an existence of a toehold results in a graduated 
decrease in the premium, on average. 
Lang et al (1989, 1991) study acquisition activity with respect to firms’ internally generated 
funds. The authors present evidence that companies characterized by strong internal free cash 
flows and relatively high book-to-market ratios are more aggressive in their acquisition 
behavior. These companies are often poorly managed and tend to pay higher premiums, on 
average. This phenomenon relates to loose shareholder scrutiny with regards to the internal 
funds relative to externally raised capital, enabling the management to exercise value-
destroying acquisitions instead of entering in NPV positive investments or distributing excess 
cash to the shareholders.  
Gondhalekar et al. (2004) find consistent results and add a note that the effect also holds 
conversely. Accordingly, companies that have a low level of internal financing available but 
are valued at low book-to-market ratios reflect under-investment behavior. As the cash flows 
are not sufficient enough to sponsor all positive NPV projects they undertake corporate 
acquisitions less frequently and tend to pay lower takeover premiums. 
In addition to relative investment activity, a given company’s acquisition behavior can be 
affected by dubious reasons that are not motivated by maximization of shareholder value. 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) identify three key factors that generally motivate 
acquisitions, namely synergy, agency and hubris. Managerial hubris, along with CEO 
overconfidence is a much-studied topic in the academic domain and found to result in value-
destroying activities, including poor mergers and acquisitions valued at excessively high 
premiums (see e.g. Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Brown and Sarma, 
2007; and Doukas and Petmezas, 2007). Interestingly, Hayward and Hambrick (1997) find that 
the effect of managerial hubris or exaggerated self-confidence in managerial decision making 
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is at its strongest when the board of directors include a high proportion of inside directors and 
when the CEO also acts as the chairman of the board.  
Other psychological factors that guide the managers’ conduct on mergers and acquisition 
activity include anchoring the bid price to the target’s earlier share price performance. The 
anchoring effect was introduced for the first time by psychologists Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974), and later applied to corporate finance by, among others, Baker et al. (2009) who find 
significant evidence that the likelihood of an acquisition being successful sees a graduated 
increase when the bid price exceeds the 52-week high of the target’s stock price. 
Not all extant literature, however, agree that hubris and behavioral biases play key roles in 
companies’ acquisition activity. Gondhalekar et al. (2004) revisit Berkovitch’s and 
Narayanan’s (1993) results on acquisition motives and present that the most prominent of the 
three motives is agency, whereas synergistic value and hubris effect are not found to be robust. 
The latter result implies that the non-value-adding measures that companies undertake are not 
caused by managerial misjudgment but rather by the managers’ tendency to prioritize their own 
utility, i.e. expected compensation and perquisites, job security, career prospects, power, 
personal reputation etc., over that of the company’s shareholders. 
 
2.1.3 Market factors 
The size of an average takeover premium also depends on the state of economy. It has been 
argued that changes in the phase of a business cycle arouse temporary market misvaluations. 
Simonyan (2014) finds that the average premium size, in relative terms, is higher during 
recessionary periods and lower during periods of considerable investor optimism. The 
implication is that the bid prices tend to factor in a correcting component towards the “true” 
long-term value of the asset depending on the current market sentiment at any given state of 
economy. 
Extant literature on mergers and acquisitions during different economic periods mostly focuses 
on the volume of transactions rather than the size of the premiums. Clearly, mergers and 
acquisitions activity tends to peak during economic booms and slow down during recessionary 
periods (see e.g. Goble and White, 1993; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Harford, 2005; and 
Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). Volume of merger activity and the size of average premiums also 
seem to be inversely interconnected. Simonyan (2014) shows that prior stock market returns 
are negatively correlated with the size of takeover premiums. Consistently, Vanne (2015) 
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presents that during recessionary periods, only mergers with high expected synergies are 
executed, whereas during times of strong investor optimism the threshold for expected 
synergies is relatively lower. Consequently, given that takeover premiums approximate 
expected synergies, the volume of transactions is lower and the average premium paid in an 
acquisition is hence higher during recessions. This theory is also supported by empirical 
evidence.  
Furthermore, Simonyan (2014) finds evidence that high takeover premiums are more likely to 
occur during times of high stock market volatility. Given that takeover premiums tend to be 
higher in the bottom of an economic cycle, the relation between premiums and volatility can be 
explained by the positively correlative relation between stock market volatility and raising 
investor pessimism, which has been documented in a theoretical setting by De Long et al. 
(1990) and empirically by Lee et al. (2002). 
Rosen (2006) finds that an acquirer’s share price is more likely to increase at the deal 
announcement if there have been many well-received acquisitions in the industry lately. This 
gives rise to so-called “hot” merger markets. Simonyan (2014) extends the analysis to the bid 
prices in public takeovers. In the study, takeover premiums too are found to exhibit positive 
autocorrelation and can, to some extent, be explained by similar momentum effect as merger 
and acquisition volumes. In other words, if multiple comparable acquisitions before a given 
transaction have been valued at a substantial premium, the transaction itself is likely to be priced 
generously. 
The best-case scenario for shareholders of a potential acquisition target is that the public tender 
offer triggers other bids from competing bidders. Naturally, if the bidders engage in an open 
bid war, the winning offer price is likely to be higher relative to the valuation in a non-contested 
acquisition. Stulz et al. (1990) study the contestability in an empirical setting and show that the 
existence of one or more competing bids increases the size of the premium. Also, Song and 
Walking (1993) find consistent results. 
 
2.2 Synergies 
Bradley et al. (1988) present evidence that merging two companies together increases their 
combined value, on average. It has been argued that this value-add reflects the amount of 
expected synergies involved in the transaction. Generally, the concept of synergy refers to a 
creation of a combined entity that is greater than the simple sum of its parts. In the domain of 
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corporate takeovers, however, the use of the term ‘synergy’ tends to vary slightly from one 
author to another. 
One way to approach the categorization of sources of synergistic value is to divide synergies to 
operating arbitrage and financial arbitrage. On the operating side, a merger can add value via 
economies of scale, which refer to the cost savings emerging from increased volume of 
production. Another source of value would be economies of scope. Unlike economies of scale, 
the scope economies do not arise from incremental volume but from improvements in 
efficiency, for example, by producing multiple distinct goods parallel. Furthermore, some 
textbooks identify transaction cost economics as a third source of value. The concept of 
transaction cost economies has sometimes been used as a central argument for a more 
philosophical question of why individual companies even exist if additional costs occur 
whenever a product or a service crosses company boundaries. From the mergers and 
acquisitions point of view, transaction cost economics can be viewed as a value-adding 
component emerging from reduced need for negotiating contracts and other frictions involved 
in intercompany trade. Together, these effects are found to motivate acquirers to bid more 
generously (Sundarsanam et al. 1996, Officer 2003). 
Yet another source of value in merging two companies together is a potential increase in the 
market power towards other stakeholders. Merging two companies together increases the sheer 
size of the combined entity, and drives the markets to a more oligopolistic or, in extreme cases, 
monopolistic direction. This is generally beneficial for the company via improved bargaining 
power with both suppliers and buyers, the latter including either retailers or end-users (or both), 
depending on the company’s business model. 
Concurrently with operating synergies, the company might be motivated to pursue a merger 
due to potential value-add via financial arbitrage. Examples of financial gains in a merger 
include decreased cost of external financing, such as bank debt due to lower uncertainty in the 
company’s cashflows, and equity due to improved liquidity of company shares in the secondary 
market. What are usually more important, nonetheless, are tax advantages that can have a 
substantial and predictable effect in the company’s finances. 
The existing research does not fully agree on the significance of operating and financial 
synergies. E.g. Gupta and Gerchak (2002) find evidence that operational synergies significantly 
affect takeover premiums. This result is also advocated by Lambrecht (2004). Inconsistently 
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with the above two, Slusky and Caves (1991) propose that the premiums are affected by 
financial although not by operational synergies. 
 
3 Hypotheses development 
 
In the preceding sections of this paper, I have identified a dichotomy of two schools of thought 
on whether synergies convincingly explain premiums paid in corporate takeovers. As has been 
covered, the proponents of the idea include e.g. Gupta and Gerchak (2002), and Lambrect 
(2004), whereas the opposing side is advocated by Slusky and Caves (1991), and Gondhalekar 
et al. (2004). While the conclusions of these studies are somewhat inconsistent with each other, 
it is unclear to what extent the inconsistency stems from (a) differences in sample sizes, 
geographies and time periods used in the data collection, and (b) what portion is respectively 
attributable to differing methods employed to measure synergistic value. 
Given the pronounced alteration in the methodological approaches between the different 
studies, the latter explanation is probable. The existing studies to date do not fully agree on how 
the concept of synergy should be defined and how it should be measured. In order to draw 
empirical conclusions, however, it is important to specify what exactly is referred to when 
synergies are discussed. In this study, it is not my ambition to author an all-inclusive analysis 
of all forms of potential synergistic value but to focus on the part that is conventionally 
considered as the most value-adding, i.e. operational synergies, especially relating to cost-
reduction (see e.g. Ficery et al., 2007). 
Consistently with earlier pieces of research that focus in measuring the cost-reduction potential 
by e.g. Rumelt (1974), Caves (1975), and Slusky and Caves (1991), I derive a measure for 
expected operational synergies from the similarity of the acquirer and the target company 
businesses. The main reasons for employing this methodological approach can be summarized 
as follows. 
(a) Similarity of the two businesses is known prior to the merger implementation, and therefore 
is more applicable to be compared with acquisition premiums, relative to e.g. materialized 
synergies known only in a post-merger state. (b) The existing research (see e.g. Rumelt 1974; 
Caves, 1975; and Slusky and Caves, 1991) has recognized that the similarity of the businesses 
strongly associates with cost-reduction potential which is found to be the most value-adding 
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source of synergistic value (see e.g. Ficery, 2007). (c) The similarity measure is minimal in its 
complexity, allowing for analyzing the synergy effect without incorporating additional 
assumptions in the formulation of the theoretical model under estimation. (d) The similarity 
measure is unequivocally convertible into a binary indicator, which enables for testing 
parameter differences between two groups determined by that binary variable. 
The expectation of operational synergies is often presented as a justification for paying 
substantial premiums (see e.g. Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; and Damodaran 2005). On the 
other hand, managers of an acquiring company might be tempted to execute transactions for 
purely private reasons such as managerial agency or hubris (see e.g. Berkovitch and Narayanan, 
1993). In this case, nonetheless, a rational justification for the transaction needs to be 
communicated to the public to convince the owners that the deal makes economic sense. 
Consequently, it is possible that expected operational synergies are used as reasoning for 
acquisitions even though the rationale for the synergy expectation would be tenuous, or at least 
overestimated in its importance. Therefore, it is unclear whether generous premiums are paid 
because the deals are likely to create synergistic value, or to ensure that transactions are 
successfully carried out, often driven by dubious motives. 
Given the abovementioned discussion, I hypothesize that takeover premiums and expected 
operational synergies are independent on each other. The first formal hypothesis reads as 
follows: 
 
H1: The level of takeover premiums is independent on expected operational synergies. 
 
Regardless of the magnitude of the interdependency between expected operational synergies 
and takeover premiums, other factors than expected synergies certainly affect acquisition 
premiums. As has been covered in the ‘2.1 Theoretical background and literature review: 
Takeover premiums’ section of this paper, a number of significant determinants have been 
identified in the existing literature. These factors include target company characteristics (such 
as target company size, ownership structure, financial leverage, etc.), buyer-related factors 
(such as preferred method of payment, information asymmetry, book-to-market ratio of the 
acquirer, etc.), and market-related factors (such as business cycle development, together with 
stock price movements prior to the deal announcement, contestability of the bid, etc.). While 
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e.g. Simonyan (2014) pays attention to the target company industry by dividing companies to 
those that operate in heavily regulated industries and companies in sectors with less central 
policy regulation, most studies disregard the potential variability in the relation between 
synergies and premiums between different industries altogether. 
Moreover, synergies have in some studies been approximated with measures that are arguably 
unequally applicable to different industries. Intuitively, however, one would expect that the 
level of expected operational synergies would systematically be higher within some industries 
and lower within others. Despite this, to the extent of my knowledge, it has not yet been 
explicitly studied whether these differences translate into higher takeover premiums. Therefore, 
testing for the possible interindustry differences provides valuable information to help 
explaining how the takeover premiums are determined, as opposed to being driven solely by 
expected synergies. Accordingly, I hypothesize that the level of takeover premiums is 
independent on the industry class. 
It is also possible that companies in different industries follow different processes in evaluating 
potential takeover targets. For example, while cost-savings from merging two companies 
together could be reasonably accurately modelled between two, say, transportation companies, 
the synergy potential would be much more difficult to estimate between two high-technology 
enterprises. As a result, expected operational synergies would play a different role as a 
determinant in the bid price between different types of industries. This potential difference is 
studied in this paper by analyzing the interaction effects between the expected operational 
synergies and the industry classes. That is, whether the expected operational synergies have an 
effect to the bid price given a condition that the target company represents a certain industry 
sector in addition to the synergy effect that is common to all industries.  
Accordingly, I hypothesize that the relationship between the expected operational synergies, 
measured by the similarity between acquirer and target company businesses, and the takeover 
premiums is independent on the industry class of the target company. The formal specification 
of the second hypothesis, expressed in two parts, is stated as follows: 
 
H2.1: Takeover premiums are industry-independent. 
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H2.2: The relationship between takeover premiums and expected operational synergies is 
independent on the target company industry. 
 
Simonyan (2014) finds empirical evidence that takeover premiums exhibit momentum. Put 
differently, the premiums are positively correlated with the premiums paid in recent 
transactions. A theoretical framework for this phenomenon is proposed by Bikhchandani et al. 
(1992). According to their view, prior mergers provide information about the profitability of 
those transactions. Thereby, it is optimal for the acquiring company’s managers to factor in 
some of that external information provided by transactions in recent history in addition to the 
managers’ own knowledge. Accordingly, the managers adjust their own evaluation of the 
appropriate size of the premium towards the average obtained from recent transactions in the 
market. Bikhchandani et al. (1992) label this dynamic as “information cascades”, which 
effectively result in a momentum effect in acquisition premiums. 
Rosen (2006) finds consistent empirical evidence on the underlying momentum in takeover 
premiums. One of the reasons the author proposes as a possible cause for the momentum effect 
is that the amount of expected synergies in all acquisitions can be commonly affected by 
external economic and regulatory shocks (see e.g. Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; and Andrade 
et al., 2001). Positive shocks induce acquiring firms to bid more generously (and vice versa for 
negative shocks), resulting in an observable momentum in paid acquisition premiums. It is left 
without empirical support, however, whether the momentum effect in the premiums arises from 
changing levels of expected synergies (as proposed by Rosen, 2006), or whether the premiums’ 
autocorrelative behavior is in fact independent of any synergy expectations. 
Given the above discussion, I expect that takeover premiums exhibit autocorrelative behavior, 
i.e. momentum. Also, I hypothesize that the possible momentum effect is independent on 
expected operational synergies, measured by the similarity of the acquirer and the target 
company businesses. The first part of the third hypothesis is of confirmatory nature regarding 
Simonyan’s (2014) and Rosen’s (2006) results, while the latter part extends their analyses by 
studying whether Rosen’s (2006) explanation for the momentum effect, i.e. that takeover 
premiums are steered by changing levels of expected synergies, can be observed empirically. 
The formal specification of the hypotheses reads as follows: 
 
24 
 
 
 
H3.1: The level of takeover premiums exhibits momentum. 
 
H3.2: The momentum effect of takeover premiums is independent on expected operational 
synergies. 
 
4 Data and variables 
 
4.1 Data sample 
I begin the sample collection by retrieving a panel data set for European corporate takeovers 
announced between January 2006 and September 2015, and recorded by October 2015 in 
Mergermarket2 data base. The set of acquisitions in the panel is virtually exhaustive within the 
given time frame in the population of transactions with a target company domiciled in a 
European country. The total number of acquisitions in the data set is 26,454. From the selection, 
I exclude transactions which lack information about one or more of the following data points: 
exact offer price per share, market price per share prior to the announcement, target enterprise 
value, and method of payment. It is noteworthy that the exclusion of transactions for which the 
market price is not available also implicitly limits the sample to publicly listed target companies 
only. In addition, acquisitions which have been announced but not successfully completed are 
excluded from the data. After exclusions, the sample size of the set of transactions employed in 
the analysis is 2,082. 
 
4.2 Variables 
4.2.1 Takeover premiums 
The size of takeover premiums (TOP) is defined as the difference between the offer price and 
the target company’s latest closing market value prior to the deal announcement. The variable 
is converted to relative terms. 
 
                                                 
2 See http://www.mergermarket.com/info/ 
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𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖 =
𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 − 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖
 
 
4.2.2 Industry classification & existence of expected operational synergies 
Each transaction in the data set is labeled with an industry classification. More specifically, I 
establish a custom list of nineteen industries covering the most frequent business sectors. This 
classification constitutes a set of binary variables. Each of the variables gets a value of one for 
transactions where the class verbally converges Mergermarket database’s (more fractionate) 
classification, and zero otherwise. The list of classes, their abbreviated notations, and 
frequencies in the sample are shown in the Table 1: Industry classification.  
Expected operational synergies are assumed to exist if the sector classification for the target 
company and the acquirer verbally converge to each other. This relation is noted with a dummy 
variable ‘Expected operational synergies’ (EXS), which gets a value of one for acquisitions 
where expected operational synergies are assumed to exist, and zero otherwise. A more detailed 
discussion on the choice for the measure of expected operational synergies is provided in the 
‘1.1 Research problem and purpose’ and ‘3 Hypothesis development’ sections of this paper. 
 
Table 1: Industry classification 
Table presents the industry classification used in this study together with industry class variable abbreviations and class 
frequencies in the data sample. Each transaction in the data belongs in 0 – 6 industry classes. The distribution of transactions 
by the number of industries where the target company is present is presented in the bottom part of the table. The data sample 
consists of 2,082 European public corporate acquisitions announced between Jan 2006 and Sep 2015, and recorded by Oct 
2015 in Mergermarket database. 
 
Industry Abbreviation Frequency
Automotive AUT 46
Biotechnology BIO 47
Chemicals and materials CHE 69
Computer software COM 223
Construction CON 128
Energy ENE 223
Financial services FIS 302
Industrial products IND 224
Internet INT 117
Leisure LEI 88
Manufacturing other MAN 84
Media MED 99
Medical MDC 150
Mining MIN 66
Real estate REE 175
Retail RET 103
Services other SER 347
Telecommunications TEL 128
Transportation TRP 106
Transactions by the number of industries where the target is present
159
1308
467
118 23 5 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
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4.2.3 Deal characteristics 
The data set identifies a set of additional dummy variables to control for general deal 
characteristics with regards to transaction size, geography, investor type, form of consideration, 
and bid type. While most of the control variables are drawn from the results of the existing 
literature, the number of controlled factors is kept as limited to avoid overfitting and to 
maximize degrees of freedom for the statistical analyses. 
The target company size is found to affect the size of acquisition premium (see e.g. Lambrecht, 
2004; and Alexandridis et al., 2013). Thus, I control for the deal value with a variable ‘Log 
enterprise value’ (LEV), noting for the natural logarithm of the bid’s total enterprise valuation 
for the target. 
Geographical diversification of a transaction is also proposed to have an influence on the 
valuation (see e.g. Dos Santos et al., 2008). Geographic characteristics of the transactions are 
controlled with variables ‘Cross boarder Europe’ (CBE) and ‘Transatlantic’ (TRA), which get 
a value of one for transaction where the target and the acquirer are domiciled in different 
countries, and different continents, respectively, and zero otherwise.  
E.g. Bargeron et al. (2008) find that the acquirer company type has a significant effect on the 
size of the premium. Investor type is therefore controlled with a dummy variable for 
nonstrategic (i.e. financial) buyers. The variable is labeled ‘Financial investor’ (FIN), and gets 
a value of one when the bidder represents the field of private equity or an equivalent industry, 
and zero otherwise. 
The means of payment is also documented to affect the bid price (see e.g. Cheng et al., 2008; 
Ayers, et al., 2003; Amihud et al., 1990; and Travlos, 1987). Thus, the form of consideration is 
controlled with two dummy variables ‘Equity payment’ (EQP) and ‘Mixed payment’ (MIP), 
Industry Abbreviation Frequency
Automotive AUT 46
Biotechnology BIO 47
Chemicals and materials CHE 69
Computer software COM 223
Construction CON 128
Energy ENE 223
Financial services FIS 302
Industrial products IND 224
Internet INT 117
Leisure LEI 88
Manufacturing other MAN 84
Media MED 99
Medical MDC 150
Mining MIN 66
Real estate REE 175
Retail RET 103
Services other SER 347
Telecommunications TEL 128
Transportation TRP 106
Transactions by the number of industries where the target is present
159
1308
467
118 23 5 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
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which note for bids with a method of payment of sole equity and a mix of cash and equity, 
respectively. The variables get a value of one where the payment is of the given type, and zero 
otherwise. Transactions in which the method of payment consists of sole cash, are implicitly 
recognized by the residual of the two abovementioned variables. I.e., the payment includes only 
cash when both variables EQP and MIP get a value of zero. 
Additionally, the bid type is controlled with two dummy variables indicating whether the bid is 
considered as hostile, and whether the acquisition has been reportedly rumored prior to the 
announcement. The variables are labeled as ‘Hostile’ (HOS) and ‘Pre-rumored’ (PRE), which 
get a value of one for hostile takeovers and pre-rumored takeovers, respectively, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
4.2.4 Business cycle 
Simonyan (2014) documents an inverse interdependency between takeover premiums and 
investor optimism. To control for changes in the general state of economy, I combine the 
transaction panel data with monthly Eurozone stock market index data, and quarterly changes 
in reported real Eurozone GDP, retrieved from S&P Capital IQ database3. Also, the data set is 
supplemented with daily reported three-month euribor rates, retrieved from Quandl4 database. 
The variables for stock market index, change in real GDP, and euribor rates are labeled as 
‘Stock market index’ (SMI), ‘Change in GDP’ (GDP), and ‘Euribor’ (EUR), respectively. 
 
5 Methodology 
 
5.1 Takeover premiums and expected operational synergies (H1) 
The relationship between the existence of expected operational synergies and the size of 
takeover premiums is tested with a classical linear regression model (CLRM) in an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) domain. In the main model specification, the variable for takeover 
premiums (TOP) is regressed on the binary variable for expected operational synergies (EXS) 
                                                 
3 See http://marketintelligence.spglobal.com/ 
4 See https://www.quandl.com/ 
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as an explanatory variable while controlling for deal characteristics and business cycle. The 
formal structure of the regression model (1) is as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑆𝑖 +∑𝛽𝑗𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝑖
12
𝑗=2
+ 𝜀𝑖 
(1) 
, where ‘control variables’ are: 
2: 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒 (𝐶𝐵𝐸) 
3: 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐 (𝑇𝑅𝐴) 
4: 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 (𝐿𝐸𝑉) 
5: 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟 (𝐹𝐼𝑁) 
6:𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 (𝐻𝑂𝑆) 
7: 𝑃𝑟𝑒 − 𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 (𝑃𝑅𝐸) 
8: 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝐸𝑄𝑃) 
9:𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝑀𝐼𝑃 
10: 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 (𝑆𝑀𝐼) 
11:𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐺𝐷𝑃 (𝐺𝐷𝑃) 
12:𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟 (𝐸𝑈𝑅) 
 
Regression model (1) is linked to hypothesis H1. Given that the estimated regression coefficient 
for expected operational synergies (EXP) is statistically significant, hypothesis H1 is rejected. 
 
5.2 Interindustry differences 
 
5.2.1 Simple industry differences (H2.1) 
Differences in the level of takeover premiums between different industries is analyzed by 
constructing a set of binary variables, each of which is designated for one of the nineteen 
industry classes. The joint significance of the industry dummies is tested with a standard F-test 
procedure. First, regression statistics are obtained from the estimated general regression model 
including all control variables and the industry dummies. The formal structure of the 
(unrestricted) regression model (2) is as follows: 
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𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑆𝑖 +∑𝛽𝑗𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝑖
12
𝑗=2
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑘,𝑖
31
𝑘=13
+ 𝜀𝑖 
(2) 
, where ‘industry variables’ are: 
13:𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 (𝐴𝑈𝑇) 
14:𝐵𝑖𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 (𝐵𝐼𝑂) 
15:𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 (𝐶𝐻𝐸) 
16:𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 (𝐶𝑂𝑀) 
17:𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐶𝑂𝑁) 
18:𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 (𝐸𝑁𝐸) 
19:𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 (𝐹𝐼𝑆) 
20: 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑠 (𝐼𝑁𝐷) 
21: 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡 (𝐼𝑁𝑇) 
22: 𝐿𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 (𝐿𝐸𝐼) 
23:𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 (𝑀𝐴𝑁) 
24:𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 (𝑀𝐸𝐷) 
25:𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 (𝑀𝐷𝐶) 
26:𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑀𝐼𝑁) 
27:𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑅𝐸𝐸) 
28:𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 (𝑅𝐸𝑇) 
29: 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 (𝑆𝐸𝑅) 
30:𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 (𝑇𝐸𝐿) 
31:𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑇𝑅𝑃) 
 
 
Subsequently, the model is restricted so that all industry variables are set equal. I.e.: 
 
𝛽13 = 𝛽14 = ⋯ = 𝛽31 
 
Under null hypothesis, the test statistic (TS) is F-distributed (with degrees of freedom 
parameters m and T-k) and is obtained from regression statistics computed from the unrestricted 
and the restricted model estimations as follows: 
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𝑇𝑆 =
𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 − 𝑈𝑅𝑆𝑆
𝑈𝑅𝑆𝑆
∗
𝑇 − 𝑘
𝑚
 ~ 𝐹(𝑚, 𝑇 − 𝑘) 
 
, where 
𝑈𝑅𝑆𝑆 = 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 = 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑚 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
𝑇 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
𝑘 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡) 
 
The F-test is linked to hypothesis H2.1. Accordingly, given that a test statistic greater than the 
appropriate critical value is observed, hypothesis H2.1 is rejected. 
 
5.2.2 Industry-differences and expected operational synergies (H2.2) 
Whether the dependency between premiums and expected operational synergies is independent 
on the target company industry is analyzed by extending the estimated regression model with 
interaction variables for joint effects between individual industry variables and the expected 
synergy variable. The formal specification of the estimated regression model (3) including 
control variables, industry main effects, and interaction terms between industries and expected 
synergies is as follows. 
 
𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑆𝑖 +∑𝛽𝑗𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝑖
12
𝑗=2
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑘,𝑖
31
𝑘=13
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚(𝑙−19)_𝐸𝑋𝑆,𝑖
50
𝑙=32
+ 𝜀𝑖 
(3) 
, where  
‘interaction terms’ are binary interaction variables between expected operational synergies (EXS) and industry variables 13, 
14, …, 31. 
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Joint significance of the interaction variables is tested with an alike F-test (see section ‘5.2.1 
Simple industry differences (H2.1)’ above). However, the restricted regression model under 
estimation is modified so that instead of restricting the main effects, the beta coefficient for the 
interaction terms are restricted while the main effects are left unrestricted. This F-test is linked 
to hypothesis H2.2. I.e., given that a test statistic greater than the appropriate critical value is 
observed, hypothesis H2.2 is rejected. 
 
5.3 Momentum effect 
Rosen (2006) analyzes the momentum effect in takeover premiums by including multiple 
lagged regressors in the estimated regression model. These variables include e.g. ‘trailing 12-
month average CAAR (of the target)’ ‘trailing 12-month return on CRSP index’, ‘trailing 12-
month return on bidder’s stock’ etc. Simonyan (2014) adopts a similar approach and includes 
various variables for trailing stock market returns and investor sentiment.  
A pronounced issue in this methodology is that the explanatory variables used to identify 
momentum tend to be highly correlated with each other. The multicollinearity in the regression 
models makes the estimated regression coefficients considerably unstable. In other words, they 
may change erratically in response to minor changes in the model or the used data, which further 
makes the interpretation of the estimated regression coefficients problematic. Therefore, in this 
study, I extend the analysis by converting the data panel into a time series of sequential 
transactions, and quarterly averages when appropriate, and study the autocorrelative properties 
of those time series. 
 
5.3.1 Overall momentum effect (H3.1) 
The overall existence of momentum is tested for individual transactions assumed to occur in a 
time sequence with equal intervals. The test follows Breusch-Godfrey procedure for testing k:th 
order autocorrelation. Specifically, I obtain the estimated error terms from the regression model 
(2) and regress the residuals on lagged error terms (up to r:th order) in addition to all regressors 
from the original model. The formal specification of the test regression is as follows: 
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𝜀?̂? = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑆𝑡 +∑𝛽𝑗𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑡,𝑗
12
𝑗=2
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑡,𝑘
31
𝑘=13
+∑𝜌𝑙𝜀?̂?−𝑙
𝑟
𝑙=1
+ 𝑢𝑡 
(4) 
, where  
𝜀?̂?−1, 𝜀?̂?−2, … , 𝜀?̂?−𝑟  𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 (𝑢𝑝 𝑡𝑜 𝑟: 𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟) 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 (2) 
 
The purpose of this is to identify whether the lagged residuals have notable power in predicting 
the (current) residual, or in other words, whether the original model exhibits autocorrelation. 
Under null hypothesis, the test statistic, calculated by multiplying the obtained R2 of the test 
regression by the difference of sample size and r, is χ2 distributed with degrees of freedom 
parameter r: 
 
𝑇𝑆 = (𝑇 − 𝑟)𝑅2 ~ χ2(𝑟) 
 
, where 
𝑇 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
𝑟 = ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 
𝑅2 = 𝑅 − 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 (4) 
 
The test is linked to hypothesis H3.1. Accordingly, if the test statistic (TS) has a value greater 
than the appropriate critical value, I fail to reject hypothesis H3.1. 
 
5.3.2 Momentum and expected operational synergies (H3.2) 
In order to analyze the momentum effect’s dependency on the expected operational synergies, 
a suitable autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model is estimated for the time series by 
plotting the autocorrelation coefficients and testing their individual statistical significances with 
standard confidence intervals, following Box Jenkins (1976) approach. The confidence 
intervals are calculated as follows: 
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0 ± 𝑧1−𝛼
2
√𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑘), 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑘) =
1
𝑇
(1 + 2∑?̂?𝑖
𝑇
𝑖=1
) , 𝑘 > 𝑇 
 
, where  
𝑧 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐶𝐷𝐹) 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝛼 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 
?̂?𝑘 = 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑘) 
𝑘 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑙𝑎𝑔 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 
𝑇 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
 
Given these results, an ARMA model with the appropriate number of lagged terms (drawn from 
the significance of the autocorrelation coefficients in the previous phase) is estimated. The 
formal specification of the ARMA(p, q) model is as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑡 = 𝜇 +∑𝜙𝑖𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
+∑𝜃𝑗𝜀𝑡−𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑡 
(5) 
, where 
𝑝, 𝑞 = ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝐶 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 
 
In this study, it is in my special interest to identify the momentum effect’s dependency on 
expected operational synergies, whereas other variables’ potential influence on the momentum 
is of only secondary interest. Therefore, I exclude all regressors other than the autoregressive 
(AR) and the moving average (MA) terms from the estimated regression model, and 
subsequently compare two subgroups, with and without expected operational synergies, to each 
other. The formal specification of the two models are the following: 
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a) 
𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑎,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑎 +∑𝜙𝑖,𝑎𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑎,𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
+∑𝜃𝑗,𝑎𝑢𝑡−𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=1
+ 𝑢𝑡 
(6) 
and 
 
b) 
𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑏,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑏 +∑𝜙𝑖,𝑏𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑏,𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
+∑𝜃𝑗,𝑏𝑣𝑡−𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=1
+ 𝑣𝑡 
(7) 
, where 
𝑝, 𝑞 = ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝐶 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 
𝑎, 𝑏 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝑋𝑆 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑋𝑆 = 0, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑦 
 
Parameter stability between the two models is tested with Chow’s test. Accordingly, maximum 
likelihood estimates for autoregressive coefficients 𝜙1, 𝜙2, … , 𝜙𝑘 and moving average 
coefficients 𝜃1, 𝜃2, … , 𝜃𝑘 for models (6) and (7) are computed. The estimated coefficients are 
hypothesized to be simultaneously equal. I.e.: 
 
𝜇𝑎 = 𝜇𝑏 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜙𝑙,𝑎 = 𝜙𝑙,𝑏 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜃𝑙,𝑎 = 𝜃𝑙,𝑏 ∀ 1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑘 
 
Restrictions in the null hypothesis are tested with an F-test where the unrestricted regression 
comes in two parts, one for each sub sample, i.e. models (6) and (7).  
With regards to the restricted model, as the coefficient estimates are drawn from periodic 
averages, the restricted model does not exactly equate with the pooled model, but instead 
combines models (6) and (7) so that both averages from the two subgroups, with and without 
expected operational synergies, are considered sequentially. This is required for technical 
comparability between residual sums of squares between the models. To help understand this, 
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let us hypothetically consider that the pooled model would in fact be employed as the restricted 
model instead of the sequential combination of the two submodels. Then, each period would 
have a larger number of transactions resulting in a lower standard deviation among the periodic 
averages. This would artificially decrease the residual sum of squares in the restricted model, 
which would make the Chow-test for parameter stability powerless in identifying any 
significant differences between the subgroups. 
The test statistic (TS) follows F-distribution (with degrees of freedom parameters k and T-2k) 
and is calculated as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑆 =
𝑅𝑆𝑆 − (𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑎 + 𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑏)
𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑎 + 𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑏
∗
𝑇 − 2𝑘
𝑘
 ~ 𝐹(𝑘, 𝑇 − 2𝑘) 
 
, where 
𝑅𝑆𝑆 = 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 
𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑎 = 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 (6) 
𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑏 = 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 (7) 
𝑇 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
𝑘 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 (5) (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡) 
 
In addition to the Chow’s test, I also test whether the individual coefficients significantly differ 
from each other between models (6) and (7). The test follows a Z-test procedure introduced by 
Clogg et al. (1995). Accordingly, each estimated regression coefficient in model (6) is 
hypothesized to be equal with the corresponding coefficients in model (7) separately. Under 
null hypothesis, the test statistic Z follows the standard normal distribution, and is calculated as 
follows: 
 
𝑍 =
𝛽𝑎 − 𝛽𝑏
√(𝑆𝐸𝛽𝑎)2 + (𝑆𝐸𝛽𝑏)2
 ~𝑁(0,1) 
 
, where 
𝛽𝑎 , 𝛽𝑏  𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠 (6) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (7), 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑦 
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𝑆𝐸(. ) 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
 
The Chow’s test and the Z-tests for individual coefficients are linked to hypothesis H3.2. 
Accordingly, if the test statistic in the Chow’s test has a value greater than the appropriate 
critical value, and the individual coefficients for lagged terms are significant, hypothesis H3.2. 
is rejected. 
 
6 Results 
 
This section presents the quantitative results of this study. I start by showing summary sample 
statistics, and subsequently proceed to presenting step-by-step results for the statistical tests 
specified in section ‘5 Methodology’ above. Discussion on the central outcomes is positioned 
after brief narratives of the technical results in three parts, namely takeover premiums and 
expected operational synergies, interindustry differences, and momentum effect. The 
discussion sections also present the preliminary conclusions for hypotheses H1, H2.1 and H2.2, 
and H3.1 and H3.2. 
The summary sample statistics are presented in Table 2: Summary sample statistics. The mean 
takeover premium (TOP) in the sample is 25.2% with a standard deviation of 35.3%. The 
median premium is 15.3%. Expected operational synergies (EXS) are deemed to be present in 
78.7% of the transactions in the sample. 
Pearson correlation coefficients between all variables are presented in Table 3: Variable 
pairwise correlations. A general conclusion with regards to pairwise correlations is that few 
variables exhibit strong correlation. The strongest correlations are observed between the set of 
business cycle control variables. Therefore, their estimated regression coefficients can be 
somewhat unstable, and as a result, are difficult to interpret. However, business cycle variables’ 
purpose is not to represent standalone relationship between the business cycle and takeover 
premiums but to jointly control for the effect. Therefore, the multicollinearity does not affect 
the results of this study. Other pairs of variables with a notable positive correlation include 
industry binaries for biotechnology (BIO) and medical (MDC), and internet (INT) and 
telecommunication (TEL). The reason for positive correlation is that many companies in the 
industry classification are deemed to belong in both industries. Again, this mainly affects the 
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standard errors of the estimated individual beta coefficients, and not their joint power as control 
variables. It is also noteworthy that many industries are generally exclusive, resulting in slight 
negative correlation coefficient between these industry pairs as well as between other mutually 
exclusive control variables. 
 
Table 2: Summary sample statistics 
The table presents the descriptive statistics for a sample of 2,082 European public corporate acquisitions announced between 
Jan 2006 and Sep 2015, and recorded by Oct 2015 in Mergermarket database. The data is extracted from Mergermarket, S&P 
Capital IQ and Quandl databases. The size of takeover premiums (TOP) is defined as the relative difference between the offer 
price and the target company’s latest closing market value prior to the deal announcement. Dummy variable Expected 
operational synergies (EXS) note for transactions where the acquirer and the target operate in the same industry sector. Target 
company industry is noted with a set of industry classification dummies, Automotive (AUT), Biotechnology (BIO), Chemicals 
and materials (CHE), Computer software (COM), Construction (CON), Energy (ENE), Financial services (FIS), Industrial 
products (IND), Internet (INT), Leisure (LEI), Manufacturing other (MAN), Media (MED), Medical (MDC), Mining (MIN), 
Real estate (REE), Retail (RET), Services other (SER), Telecommunications (TEL), and Transportation (TRP). Geographical 
reach of the transaction is classified with a set of geographic dummies, Cross border Europe (CBE), and Transatlantic (TRA). 
Variable Log enterprise value (LEV) notes for the natural logarithm of the implied target enterprise value. Bidder type is 
categorized with a dummy variable Financial investor (FIN). Method of payment is noted with a set of dummy variables Equity 
payment (EQP), and Mixed payment (MIP). Dummy variable Hostile (HOS) notes for bids that are considered as hostile. 
Dummy variable Pre-rumored (PRE) notes for pre-rumored bids. Business cycle related variables Stock market index (SMI), 
Change in GDP (GDP), and Euribor (EUR) note for monthly reported Eurozone stock market index, quarterly changes in 
reported Eurozone real GDP, and daily reported three-month euribor rate, respectively. Combinations of variable EXS and 
industry class dummies note for the given variables’ joint occurrence. 
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Table 3: Variable pairwise correlations 
Table presents the pairwise correlation between all variables in the sample of 2,082 European public corporate acquisitions 
announced between Jan 2006 and Sep 2015, and recorded by Oct 2015 in Mergermarket database. The data is extracted from 
Mergermarket, S&P Capital IQ and Quandl databases. The size of takeover premiums (TOP) is defined as the relative difference 
between the offer price and the target company’s latest closing market value prior to the deal announcement. Dummy variable 
Expected operational synergies (EXS) note for transactions where the acquirer and the target operate in the same industry 
sector. Geographical reach of the transaction is classified with a set of geographic dummies, Cross border Europe (CBE), and 
Transatlantic (TRA). Variable Log enterprise value (LEV) notes for the natural logarithm of the implied target enterprise value. 
Bidder type is categorized with a dummy variable Financial investor (FIN). Method of payment is noted with a set of dummy 
variables Equity payment (EQP), and Mixed payment (MIP). Dummy variable Hostile (HOS) notes for bids that are considered 
as hostile. Dummy variable Pre-rumored (PRE) notes for pre-rumored bids. Business cycle related variables Stock market 
index (SMI), Change in GDP (GDP), and Euribor (EUR) note for monthly reported Eurozone stock market index, quarterly 
changes in reported Eurozone real GDP, and daily reported three-month euribor rate, respectively. Target company industry is 
noted with a set of industry classification dummies, Automotive (AUT), Biotechnology (BIO), Chemicals and materials (CHE), 
Computer software (COM), Construction (CON), Energy (ENE), Financial services (FIS), Industrial products (IND), Internet 
(INT), Leisure (LEI), Manufacturing other (MAN), Media (MED), Medical (MDC), Mining (MIN), Real estate (REE), Retail 
(RET), Services other (SER), Telecommunications (TEL), and Transportation (TRP). 
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6.1 Takeover premiums and expected operational synergies 
Results for the estimated model (1) provide evidence that expected operational synergies (EXS) 
do not have significant power in explaining takeover premiums (TOP). The estimated beta 
coefficient for expected operational synergies (EXS) is -0.002 with an estimated standard error 
of 0.020 and a p-value of 0.920. To be statistically significant at the conventional significance 
level of 5%, the coefficient would have to be about twenty times larger (in absolute terms) than 
what the results imply. 
Estimated coefficients for geographic control variables, cross border Europe (CBE) and 
transatlantic (TRA), 0.056 and 0.092, respectively, are highly significant. Also, log enterprise 
value (LEV) has a highly significant coefficient of -0.018. Dummy variable for pre-rumored 
deals (PRE) is highly significant, with an estimated coefficient of -0.118. From business cycle 
variables, stock market index (SMI) and change in GDP (GDP) are significant, while euribor 
(EUR) does not produce a significant coefficient. Other control variables, including indicators 
for financial investor (FIN), hostile takeovers (HOS), and methods of payment comprising two 
variables, equity payment (EQP) and mixed payment (MIP), do not produce statistically 
significant regression coefficients. 
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Full results for estimated model (1) are shown in Table 4: Results for cross-sectional regression 
model (1). 
 
Table 4: Results for cross-sectional regression model (1) 
Table presents the results for the cross-sectional OLS regression model (1) with the following specification: 
𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑆𝑖 +∑𝛽𝑗𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝑖
12
𝑗=2
+ 𝜀𝑖 
The data sample consists of 2,082 European public corporate acquisitions announced between Jan 2006 and Sep 2015, and 
recorded by Oct 2015 in Mergermarket database. The data is extracted from Mergermarket, S&P Capital IQ and Quandl 
databases. The size of takeover premiums (TOP) is defined as the relative difference between the offer price and the target 
company’s latest closing market value prior to the deal announcement. Dummy variable Expected operational synergies (EXS) 
note for transactions where the acquirer and the target operate in the same industry sector. With regards to the control variables, 
geographical reach of the transaction is classified with a set of geographic dummies, Cross border Europe (CBE), and 
Transatlantic (TRA). Variable Log enterprise value (LEV) notes for the natural logarithm of the implied target enterprise value. 
Bidder type is categorized with a dummy variable Financial investor (FIN). Method of payment is noted with a set of dummy 
variables Equity payment (EQP), and Mixed payment (MIP). Dummy variable Hostile (HOS) notes for bids that are considered 
as hostile. Dummy variable Pre-rumored (PRE) notes for pre-rumored bids. Business cycle related variables Stock market 
index (SMI), Change in GDP (GDP), and Euribor (EUR) note for monthly reported Eurozone stock market index, quarterly 
changes in reported Eurozone real GDP, and daily reported three-month euribor rate, respectively. 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Std.Err. t-Stat. P-value Lower95% Upper95% Significance
Constant 0.550 0.057 9.683 0.000 0.439 0.662 ******
Expected synergies EXS -0.002 0.020 -0.100 0.920 -0.040 0.036 ***
Cross border Europe CBE 0.056 0.017 3.329 0.001 0.023 0.089 ***
Transatlantic TRA 0.092 0.022 4.081 0.000 0.048 0.136 ***
Log enterprise value LEV -0.018 0.004 -4.788 0.000 -0.026 -0.011 ***
Financial investor FIN -0.042 0.026 -1.612 0.107 -0.094 0.009
Hostile HOS -0.048 0.043 -1.106 0.269 -0.133 0.037
Pre-rumoured PRE -0.118 0.018 -6.592 0.000 -0.153 -0.083 ***
Equity payment EQP 0.004 0.027 0.151 0.880 -0.049 0.057
Mixed payment MIP 0.005 0.033 0.161 0.872 -0.059 0.069
Stock market index SMI 0.000 0.000 -3.366 0.001 0.000 0.000 ***
Change in GDP GDP -3.228 1.494 -2.161 0.031 -6.157 -0.298 **
Euribor EUR 0.004 0.005 0.896 0.370 -0.005 0.014
Regression statistics R-Squared Adj.R-Sqr. Std.Err.Reg. Std. Dev. N
0.069 0.063 0.341 0.353 2080
Analysis of Variance
Source df Sum Sqrs. F P-value
Regression 12 17.725 12.670 0.000
Residual 2067 240.976
Total 2079 258.701
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6.1.1 Discussion: Takeover premiums and expected operational synergies 
Given the abovementioned evidence, I fail to reject hypothesis H1, and conclude that expected 
operational synergies generally do not explain the level of takeover premiums. The results are 
consistent with Slusky and Caves (1991), and Gondhalekar et al. (2004). 
The observed independency between the premiums and the expected synergies suggests that 
corporate takeovers are generally driven by motives other than maximization of shareholder 
value. While it is not explicitly studied in this paper, existing financial literature suggests that 
much of the excess mergers and acquisitions activity is attributable to the managers’ personal 
benefits, such as increased compensation, job security, and social status (see e.g. Trautwein, 
1990). Besides the volume, it is likely that the size of the premiums is likewise affected. In 
addition to acting in their own, rather than the shareholders’, benefit, it is possible that the 
managers simply fall in love with the idea of a given acquisition, and subsequently fail to reject 
the acquisition plan even though a more rigorous analysis would reveal that the numbers do not 
add up (see e.g. Eccles et al., 1999). 
Besides private benefits, another motive for carrying out acquisitions might stem from long-
term strategic reasons. In this case, the value-add to the acquirer shareholders would not 
necessarily be imminently reflected in the share price but gradually surfaces going forward. 
Undoubtedly, strategic features are often present in takeovers where the acquirer is expanding 
geographically. Interestingly, the data provides evidence that cross-border acquisitions appear 
to be valued more generously in terms of the premiums. Furthermore, the longer is the distance 
between the acquirer and the target company domiciles the higher are the premiums. 
Given the observed premium for geographic diversification, it is possible that managers are 
generally willing to pay for the strategic value created via the acquisition. It is noteworthy, 
however, that while the managers might be sincere in their efforts to create shareholder value, 
it appears that their assessment, on average, is miscalibrated and overconfident. Thus, in the 
majority of acquisitions, the long-term value add tends to not materialize. This is suggested by 
results in the existing literature that acquiring firms, on average, destroy value from the 
acquiring company shareholders’ point of view, particularly when high premiums are paid (see 
e.g. Fuller et al., 2002; and Krishnan et al., 2007). 
Also, other possible reasons exist for the higher level of takeover premiums when the acquirer 
and the target are domiciled in different countries. These reasons include financial arbitrage 
such as tax advantages and exploiting imperfect capital markets, among others. Accordingly, it 
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is possible that financial synergies have some power in explaining the takeover premiums, 
unlike those in the operational domain. As the similarity measure for expected operational 
synergies employed in this study is poorly apt to capture any financial synergies, financial 
synergies’ role as a determinant of takeover premiums is left undecided, to the extent of this 
study. 
 
6.2 Interindustry differences 
6.2.1 Simple industry differences 
With regards to results for the F-test with parameter restrictions for industry variables, the F-
statistic 2.435 (degrees of freedom: 18, 2048) is highly significant with a p-value of 0.001. I.e. 
the industry classification (jointly) has significant power in explaining takeover premiums 
(TOP). 
Estimated regression statistics for the unrestricted model (2) are presented in Table 5: Results 
for cross-sectional regression model (2). Among industry variables, a coefficient of 0.171 for 
automotive (AUT) is statistically highly significant. Other significant determinants include 
financial services (FIS), manufacturing, other (MAN), and media (MED), with coefficients of 
-0.049, -0.091, and 0.086, respectively. A weak significance is observed for construction (CON) 
and industrial products (IND) coefficients -0.055 and -0.049, respectively. Coefficients for 
other industry variables are insignificant. 
Introducing the set of industry variables does not notably change estimated coefficients for 
expected operational synergies (EXS) and control variables. Likewise in model (1), the 
estimated coefficient for expected operational synergies (EXS), -0.005, is insignificant. 
Coefficients for cross border Europe (CBE), transatlantic (TRA), log enterprise value (LEV), 
pre-rumored (PRE), stock market index (SMI), and change in GDP (GDP) are significant. Other 
control variables, including financial investor (FIN), hostile (HOS), equity payment (EQP), and 
mixed payment (MIP), are insignificant. 
 
Table 5: Results for cross-sectional regression model (2) 
Table presents the results for the cross-sectional OLS regression model (2) with the following specification: 
𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑆𝑖 +∑𝛽𝑗𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝑖
12
𝑗=2
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑘,𝑖
31
𝑘=13
+ 𝜀𝑖 
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The data sample consists of 2,082 European public corporate acquisitions announced between Jan 2006 and Sep 2015, and 
recorded by Oct 2015 in Mergermarket database. The data is extracted from Mergermarket, S&P Capital IQ and Quandl 
databases. The size of takeover premiums (TOP) is defined as the relative difference between the offer price and the target 
company’s latest closing market value prior to the deal announcement. Dummy variable Expected operational synergies (EXS) 
note for transactions where the acquirer and the target operate in the same industry sector. With regards to the control variables, 
geographical reach of the transaction is classified with a set of geographic dummies, Cross border Europe (CBE), and 
Transatlantic (TRA). Variable Log enterprise value (LEV) notes for the natural logarithm of the implied target enterprise value. 
Bidder type is categorized with a dummy variable Financial investor (FIN). Method of payment is noted with a set of dummy 
variables Equity payment (EQP), and Mixed payment (MIP). Dummy variable Hostile (HOS) notes for bids that are considered 
as hostile. Dummy variable Pre-rumored (PRE) notes for pre-rumored bids. Business cycle related variables Stock market 
index (SMI), Change in GDP (GDP), and Euribor (EUR) note for monthly reported Eurozone stock market index, quarterly 
changes in reported Eurozone real GDP, and daily reported three-month euribor rate, respectively. Target company industry is 
noted with a set of industry classification dummies, Automotive (AUT), Biotechnology (BIO), Chemicals and materials (CHE), 
Computer software (COM), Construction (CON), Energy (ENE), Financial services (FIS), Industrial products (IND), Internet 
(INT), Leisure (LEI), Manufacturing other (MAN), Media (MED), Medical (MDC), Mining (MIN), Real estate (REE), Retail 
(RET), Services other (SER), Telecommunications (TEL), and Transportation (TRP). 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Std.Err. t-Stat. P-value Lower95% Upper95% Significance
Constant 0.553 0.059 9.428 0.000 0.438 0.668 ******
Expected synergies EXS -0.005 0.020 -0.229 0.819 -0.044 0.035 ***
Cross border Europe CBE 0.055 0.017 3.269 0.001 0.022 0.088 ***
Transatlantic TRA 0.089 0.023 3.889 0.000 0.044 0.133 ***
Log enterprise value LEV -0.016 0.004 -3.927 0.000 -0.024 -0.008 ***
Financial investor FIN -0.033 0.027 -1.252 0.211 -0.086 0.019
Hostile HOS -0.054 0.043 -1.252 0.211 -0.139 0.031
Pre-rumoured PRE -0.118 0.018 -6.549 0.000 -0.153 -0.082 ***
Equity payment EQP 0.007 0.027 0.265 0.791 -0.046 0.061
Mixed payment MIP 0.003 0.033 0.088 0.930 -0.061 0.067
Stock market index SMI 0.000 0.000 -3.322 0.001 0.000 0.000 ***
Change in GDP GDP -3.158 1.496 -2.111 0.035 -6.092 -0.224 **
Euribor EUR 0.004 0.005 0.859 0.390 -0.005 0.014 ***
Automotive AUT 0.171 0.052 3.303 0.001 0.070 0.273 ***
Biotechnology BIO -0.015 0.055 -0.265 0.791 -0.122 0.093
Chemicals and materials CHE -0.044 0.043 -1.025 0.306 -0.128 0.040
Computer software COM 0.010 0.027 0.358 0.720 -0.043 0.062
Construction CON -0.055 0.032 -1.715 0.087 -0.119 0.008 *
Energy ENE 0.008 0.026 0.307 0.759 -0.043 0.059
Financial services FIS -0.049 0.024 -2.073 0.038 -0.096 -0.003 **
Industrial products IND -0.049 0.026 -1.927 0.054 -0.099 0.001 *
Internet INT 0.021 0.035 0.594 0.553 -0.048 0.090
Leisure LEI -0.052 0.038 -1.361 0.174 -0.128 0.023
Manufacturing other MAN -0.091 0.039 -2.340 0.019 -0.167 -0.015 **
Media MED 0.086 0.036 2.375 0.018 0.015 0.156 **
Medical MDC 0.000 0.033 0.004 0.997 -0.065 0.065
Mining MIN -0.036 0.044 -0.823 0.411 -0.123 0.050
Real estate REE 0.010 0.029 0.350 0.726 -0.046 0.066
Retail RET -0.056 0.036 -1.570 0.116 -0.127 0.014
Services other SER 0.011 0.021 0.548 0.584 -0.029 0.052
Telecommunications TEL -0.053 0.034 -1.541 0.123 -0.121 0.014
Transportation TRP 0.044 0.036 1.231 0.218 -0.026 0.114
Regression statistics R-Squared Adj.R-Sqr. Std.Err.Reg. Std. Dev. N
0.088 0.074 0.339 0.353 2080
Analysis of Variance
Source df Sum Sqrs. F P-value
Regression 31 22.841 6.398 0.000
Residual 2048 235.860
Total 2079 258.701
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6.2.2 Industry-differences and expected operational synergies 
The test statistic for the F-test with parameter restrictions for interaction terms between 
expected operational synergies (EXS) and the industry variables is 1.732 (degrees of freedom: 
18, 2029). The F-statistic is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.028. Thus, the interaction 
terms (jointly) have significant power in explaining takeover premiums (EXS). 
Estimated regression statistics for the unrestricted model (3) are presented Table 6: Results for 
cross-sectional regression model (3). Among the interaction terms, the coefficient for real 
estate (EXS_REE), -0.225, is highly significant. Also, the coefficient for automotive 
(EXS_AUT), -0.307, is significant. Other interaction terms are individually insignificant. 
Inclusion of the interaction terms does not change estimated coefficients for expected 
operational synergies (EXS) and control variables considerably. The estimated coefficient for 
expected operational synergies (EXS) is 0.015 and insignificant. Likewise in models (1) and 
(2), cross border Europe (CBE), transatlantic (TRA), log enterprise value (LEV), pre-rumored 
(PRE), stock market index (SMI), and change in GDP (GDP) are statistically significant. Other 
control variables, financial investor (FIN), hostile (HOS), equity payment (EQP), and mixed 
payment (MIP), are insignificant. 
Estimated coefficients for the industry main effects, however, alter slightly when the interaction 
terms are included. Among industry main effect variables in the unrestricted model (3), 
variables for automotive (AUT) and real estate (REE) are highly significant, with estimated 
coefficients of 0.425 and 0.175, respectively. 
 
Table 6: Results for cross-sectional regression model (3) 
Table presents the results for the cross-sectional OLS regression model (3) with the following specification: 
𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑆𝑖 +∑𝛽𝑗𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝑖
12
𝑗=2
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑘,𝑖
31
𝑘=13
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚(𝑙−19)_𝐸𝑋𝑆,𝑖
50
𝑙=32
+ 𝜀𝑖 
The data sample consists of 2,082 European public corporate acquisitions announced between Jan 2006 and Sep 2015, and 
recorded by Oct 2015 in Mergermarket database. The data is extracted from Mergermarket, S&P Capital IQ and Quandl 
databases. The size of takeover premiums (TOP) is defined as the relative difference between the offer price and the target 
company’s latest closing market value prior to the deal announcement. Dummy variable Expected operational synergies (EXS) 
note for transactions where the acquirer and the target operate in the same industry sector. With regards to the control variables, 
geographical reach of the transaction is classified with a set of geographic dummies, Cross border Europe (CBE), and 
Transatlantic (TRA). Variable Log enterprise value (LEV) notes for the natural logarithm of the implied target enterprise value. 
Bidder type is categorized with a dummy variable Financial investor (FIN). Method of payment is noted with a set of dummy 
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variables Equity payment (EQP), and Mixed payment (MIP). Dummy variable Hostile (HOS) notes for bids that are considered 
as hostile. Dummy variable Pre-rumored (PRE) notes for pre-rumored bids. Business cycle related variables Stock market 
index (SMI), Change in GDP (GDP), and Euribor (EUR) note for monthly reported Eurozone stock market index, quarterly 
changes in reported Eurozone real GDP, and daily reported three-month euribor rate, respectively. Target company industry is 
noted with a set of industry classification dummies, Automotive (AUT), Biotechnology (BIO), Chemicals and materials (CHE), 
Computer software (COM), Construction (CON), Energy (ENE), Financial services (FIS), Industrial products (IND), Internet 
(INT), Leisure (LEI), Manufacturing other (MAN), Media (MED), Medical (MDC), Mining (MIN), Real estate (REE), Retail 
(RET), Services other (SER), Telecommunications (TEL), and Transportation (TRP). Combinations of variable EXS and 
industry class dummies note for the given variables’ joint occurrence, i.e. interaction terms. 
Variable Coefficient Std.Err. t-Stat. P-value Lower95% Upper95% Significance
Constant 0.539 0.064 8.368 0.000 0.413 0.666 ******
Expected synergies EXS 0.015 0.039 0.400 0.689 -0.060 0.091 ***
Cross border Europe CBE 0.054 0.017 3.189 0.001 0.021 0.087 ***
Transatlantic TRA 0.089 0.023 3.882 0.000 0.044 0.133 ***
Log enterprise value LEV -0.016 0.004 -3.919 0.000 -0.024 -0.008 ***
Financial investor FIN -0.022 0.028 -0.782 0.434 -0.076 0.033
Hostile HOS -0.045 0.043 -1.040 0.299 -0.130 0.040
Pre-rumoured PRE -0.118 0.018 -6.596 0.000 -0.154 -0.083 ***
Equity payment EQP 0.014 0.027 0.500 0.617 -0.040 0.067
Mixed payment MIP 0.006 0.033 0.184 0.854 -0.058 0.070
Stock market index SMI 0.000 0.000 -3.438 0.001 0.000 0.000 ***
Change in GDP GDP -2.784 1.498 -1.858 0.063 -5.722 0.154 *
Euribor EUR 0.004 0.005 0.832 0.405 -0.005 0.013 ***
Automotive AUT 0.425 0.131 3.247 0.001 0.168 0.681 ***
Biotechnology BIO -0.073 0.094 -0.771 0.441 -0.258 0.112
Chemicals and materials CHE -0.050 0.076 -0.662 0.508 -0.198 0.098
Computer software COM 0.067 0.051 1.306 0.192 -0.034 0.168
Construction CON -0.070 0.060 -1.161 0.246 -0.187 0.048
Energy ENE -0.017 0.057 -0.294 0.769 -0.128 0.095
Financial services FIS -0.058 0.079 -0.734 0.463 -0.212 0.097
Industrial products IND 0.006 0.056 0.111 0.912 -0.104 0.116
Internet INT 0.107 0.065 1.644 0.100 -0.021 0.235
Leisure LEI -0.128 0.072 -1.783 0.075 -0.269 0.013 *
Manufacturing other MAN -0.122 0.073 -1.658 0.097 -0.265 0.022 *
Media MED -0.049 0.093 -0.522 0.602 -0.232 0.135
Medical MDC 0.005 0.068 0.072 0.943 -0.129 0.139
Mining MIN 0.014 0.086 0.163 0.871 -0.154 0.182
Real estate REE 0.175 0.056 3.113 0.002 0.065 0.286 ***
Retail RET -0.077 0.064 -1.190 0.234 -0.203 0.050
Services other SER -0.032 0.046 -0.698 0.485 -0.123 0.058
Telecommunications TEL -0.073 0.062 -1.191 0.234 -0.194 0.047
Transportation TRP 0.042 0.069 0.617 0.537 -0.092 0.177 ***
EXS_Automotive EXS_AUT -0.307 0.143 -2.148 0.032 -0.587 -0.027 **
EXS_Biotechnology EXS_BIO 0.094 0.116 0.816 0.415 -0.133 0.322
EXS_Chemicals and materials EXS_CHE 0.026 0.092 0.281 0.779 -0.154 0.205
EXS_Computer software EXS_COM -0.072 0.060 -1.205 0.228 -0.189 0.045
EXS_Construction EXS_CON 0.020 0.071 0.285 0.776 -0.119 0.159
EXS_Energy EXS_ENE 0.037 0.064 0.577 0.564 -0.088 0.162
EXS_Financial services EXS_FIS 0.012 0.083 0.149 0.882 -0.150 0.175
EXS_Industrial products EXS_IND -0.065 0.063 -1.025 0.305 -0.188 0.059
EXS_Internet EXS_INT -0.116 0.077 -1.499 0.134 -0.267 0.036
EXS_Leisure EXS_LEI 0.109 0.085 1.285 0.199 -0.057 0.276
EXS_Manufacturing  other EXS_MAN 0.039 0.087 0.453 0.651 -0.131 0.209
EXS_Media EXS_MED 0.159 0.101 1.564 0.118 -0.040 0.357
EXS_Medical EXS_MDC -0.008 0.078 -0.101 0.920 -0.161 0.146
EXS_Mining EXS_MIN -0.067 0.099 -0.672 0.502 -0.261 0.128
EXS_Real estate EXS_REE -0.225 0.065 -3.470 0.001 -0.352 -0.098 ***
EXS_Retail EXS_RET 0.036 0.078 0.469 0.639 -0.116 0.188
EXS_Services  other EXS_SER 0.054 0.052 1.055 0.292 -0.047 0.155
EXS_Telecommunications EXS_TEL 0.027 0.073 0.372 0.710 -0.117 0.171
EXS_Transportation EXS_TRP 0.004 0.080 0.054 0.957 -0.153 0.161
Regression statistics R-Squared Adj.R-Sqr. Std.Err.Reg. Std. Dev. N
0.102 0.080 0.338 0.353 2080
Analysis of Variance
Source df Sum Sqrs. F P-value
Regression 50 26.414 4.614 0.000
Residual 2029 232.287
Total 2079 258.701
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6.2.3 Discussion: Interindustry differences 
Given the evidence provided by the data, I reject hypothesis H2.1, and conclude that takeover 
premiums exhibit significant differences between industries. Not all industries, however, 
produce systematically different premiums. Instead, the effect appears to be limited to a handful 
of sectors, namely automotive, financial services, other manufacturing, and media. Among the 
above, the premiums are significantly higher within automotive and media sectors, while lower 
premiums are observed within acquisitions of financial services and other manufacturing 
companies. 
Based on the results of the latter F-test, I also reject hypothesis H2.2. Accordingly, it is 
concluded that expected operational synergies’ role as a determinant of the takeover premiums 
does differ between industries. Nonetheless, only two of the interaction effects between 
expected operational synergies and industry classes produce statistically significant 
coefficients. These variables are for automotive and real estate industries. Coefficients for the 
both significant interaction terms are negative. 
As an interesting side note, 12 out of the 17 other sectors have positive, although insignificant, 
coefficients. A simple binomial (two-tailed) probability for such extreme distribution between 
positive and negative coefficient signs (assuming equal likelihood between the two) is less than 
5%. One possible implication would be that the expected synergies drive the valuation weakly 
within some industries but not at all within other sectors, which further results in an insignificant 
coefficient estimate for expected operational synergies when all industries are pooled together. 
However, given the results of regression models (1) and (2), i.e. the estimated coefficients for 
the expected operational synergies are not only insignificant but in fact negative, the 
abovearticulated explanation seems unlikely to hold generally. 
A possible implication of these results is that valuation processes associated with acquisitions 
follow different conventions between industries. The potential for operational synergy can be 
easier to assess within some industries relative to others. On that account, an example of cost-
savings potential in merging two transportation networks as opposed to merging two high-
Variable Coefficient Std.Err. t-Stat. P-value Lower95% Upper95% Significance
Constant 0.539 0.064 8.368 0.000 0.413 0.666 ******
Expected synergies EXS 0.015 0.039 0.400 0.689 -0.060 0.091 ***
Cross border Europe CBE 0.054 0.017 3.189 0.001 0.021 0.087 ***
Transatlantic TRA 0.089 0.023 3.882 0.000 0.044 0.133 ***
Log enterprise value LEV -0.016 0.004 -3.919 0.000 -0.024 -0.008 ***
Financial investor FIN -0.022 0.028 -0.782 0.434 -0.076 0.033
Hostile HOS -0.045 0.043 -1.040 0.299 -0.130 0.040
Pre-rumoured PRE -0.118 0.018 -6.596 0.000 -0.154 -0.083 ***
Equity payment EQP 0.014 0.027 0.500 0.617 -0.040 0.067
Mixed payment MIP 0.006 0.033 0.184 0.854 -0.058 0.070
Stock market index SMI 0.000 0.000 -3.438 0.001 0.000 0.000 ***
Change in GDP GDP -2.784 1.498 -1.858 0.063 -5.722 0.154 *
Euribor EUR 0.004 0.005 0.832 0.405 -0.005 0.013 ***
Automotive AUT 0.425 0.131 3.247 0.001 0.168 0.681 ***
Biotechnology BIO -0.073 0.094 -0.771 0.441 -0.258 0.112
Chemicals and materials CHE -0.050 0.076 -0.662 0.508 -0.198 0.098
Computer software COM 0.067 0.051 1.306 0.192 -0.034 0.168
Construction CON -0.070 0.060 -1.161 0.246 -0.187 0.048
Energy ENE -0.017 0.057 -0.294 0.769 -0.128 0.095
Financial services FIS -0.058 0.079 -0.734 0.463 -0.212 0.097
Industrial products IND 0.006 0.056 0.111 0.912 -0.104 0.116
Internet INT 0.107 0.065 1.644 0.100 -0.021 0.235
Leisure LEI -0.128 0.072 -1.783 0.075 -0.269 0.013 *
Manufacturing other MAN -0.122 0.073 -1.658 0.097 -0.265 0.022 *
Media MED -0.049 0.093 -0.522 0.602 -0.232 0.135
Medical MDC 0.005 0.068 0.072 0.943 -0.129 0.139
Mining MIN 0.014 0.086 0.163 0.871 -0.154 0.182
Real estate REE 0.175 0.056 3.113 0.002 0.065 0.286 ***
Retail RET -0.077 0.064 -1.190 0.234 -0.203 0.050
Services other SER -0.032 0.046 -0.698 0.485 -0.123 0.058
Telecommunications TEL -0.073 0.062 -1.191 0.234 -0.194 0.047
Transportation TRP 0.042 0.069 0.617 0.537 -0.092 0.177 ***
EXS_Automotive EXS_AUT -0.307 0.143 -2.148 0.032 -0.587 -0.027 **
EXS_Biotechnology EXS_BIO 0.094 0.116 0.816 0.415 -0.133 0.322
EXS_Chemicals and materials EXS_CHE 0.026 0.092 0.281 0.779 -0.154 0.205
EXS_Computer software EXS_COM -0.072 0.060 -1.205 0.228 -0.189 0.045
EXS_Construction EXS_CON 0.020 0.071 0.285 0.776 -0.119 0.159
EXS_Energy EXS_ENE 0.037 0.064 0.577 0.564 -0.088 0.162
EXS_Financial services EXS_FIS 0.012 0.083 0.149 0.882 -0.150 0.175
EXS_Industrial products EXS_IND -0.065 0.063 -1.025 0.305 -0.188 0.059
EXS_Internet EXS_INT -0.116 0.077 -1.499 0.134 -0.267 0.036
EXS_Leisure EXS_LEI 0.109 0.085 1.285 0.199 -0.057 0.276
EXS_Manufacturing  other EXS_MAN 0.039 0.087 0.453 0.651 -0.131 0.209
EXS_Media EXS_MED 0.159 0.101 1.564 0.118 -0.040 0.357
EXS_Medical EXS_MDC -0.008 0.078 -0.101 0.920 -0.161 0.146
EXS_Mining EXS_MIN -0.067 0.099 -0.672 0.502 -0.261 0.128
EXS_Real estate EXS_REE -0.225 0.065 -3.470 0.001 -0.352 -0.098 ***
EXS_Retail EXS_RET 0.036 0.078 0.469 0.639 -0.116 0.188
EXS_Services  other EXS_SER 0.054 0.052 1.055 0.292 -0.047 0.155
EXS_Telecommunications EXS_TEL 0.027 0.073 0.372 0.710 -0.117 0.171
EXS_Transportation EXS_TRP 0.004 0.080 0.054 0.957 -0.153 0.161
Regression statistics R-Squared Adj.R-Sqr. Std.Err.Reg. Std. Dev. N
0.102 0.080 0.338 0.353 2080
Analysis of Variance
Source df Sum Sqrs. F P-value
Regression 50 26.414 4.614 0.000
Residual 2029 232.287
Total 2079 258.701
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technology companies was given earlier in this paper. If the synergistic potential is easier to 
measure prior to the acquisition, it would be intuitively expected that larger portion of the 
expected synergy would be then incorporated in the premium. Nonetheless, the fact that none 
of the individual interaction variables between expected operational synergies and industries 
was estimated to be positively significant largely disallows drawing any further conclusions 
based on the employed data. 
 
6.3 Momentum 
6.3.1 Overall momentum effect 
Regression statistics for model (4) with lagged residuals up to 20th order are presented in Table 
7: Results for test regression of Breusch-Godfrey test for 20:th order autocorrelation. The test 
statistic, 35.978, is greater than the Chi-squared critical value (degrees of freedom: 24) with a 
significance level of 5%, 31.410. P-value for the test statistic is 0.015. It is therefore concluded 
that the estimated residual terms (jointly) in model (2) do exhibit significant autocorrelation. 
 
Table 7: Results for test regression of Breusch-Godfrey test for 20:th order 
autocorrelation 
Table presents the results for Breusch-Godfrey test regression, i.e. model (4), with the following specification: 
𝜀?̂? = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑆𝑡 +∑𝛽𝑗𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑡,𝑗
12
𝑗=2
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑡,𝑘
31
𝑘=13
+∑𝜌𝑙𝜀?̂?−𝑙
20
𝑙=1
+ 𝑢𝑡 
The data sample consists of 2,082 European public corporate acquisitions announced between Jan 2006 and Sep 2015, and 
recorded by Oct 2015 in Mergermarket database. The data is extracted from Mergermarket, S&P Capital IQ and Quandl 
databases. The size of takeover premiums (TOP) is defined as the relative difference between the offer price and the target 
company’s latest closing market value prior to the deal announcement. Dummy variable Expected operational synergies (EXS) 
note for transactions where the acquirer and the target operate in the same industry sector. With regards to the control variables, 
geographical reach of the transaction is classified with a set of geographic dummies, Cross border Europe (CBE), and 
Transatlantic (TRA). Variable Log enterprise value (LEV) notes for the natural logarithm of the implied target enterprise value. 
Bidder type is categorized with a dummy variable Financial investor (FIN). Method of payment is noted with a set of dummy 
variables Equity payment (EQP), and Mixed payment (MIP). Dummy variable Hostile (HOS) notes for bids that are considered 
as hostile. Dummy variable Pre-rumored (PRE) notes for pre-rumored bids. Business cycle related variables Stock market 
index (SMI), Change in GDP (GDP), and Euribor (EUR) note for monthly reported Eurozone stock market index, quarterly 
changes in reported Eurozone real GDP, and daily reported three-month euribor rate, respectively. Target company industry is 
noted with a set of industry classification dummies, Automotive (AUT), Biotechnology (BIO), Chemicals and materials (CHE), 
Computer software (COM), Construction (CON), Energy (ENE), Financial services (FIS), Industrial products (IND), Internet 
(INT), Leisure (LEI), Manufacturing other (MAN), Media (MED), Medical (MDC), Mining (MIN), Real estate (REE), Retail 
(RET), Services other (SER), Telecommunications (TEL), and Transportation (TRP). 
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Variable Coefficient Std.Err. t-Stat. P-value Lower95% Upper95% Significance
Constant 0.013 0.059 0.220 0.826 -0.103 0.129 ***
Expected synergies EXS -0.003 0.020 -0.147 0.883 -0.043 0.037 ***
Cross border Europe CBE -0.002 0.017 -0.118 0.906 -0.035 0.031
Transatlantic TRA -0.010 0.023 -0.414 0.679 -0.055 0.036
Log enterprise value LEV 0.001 0.004 0.237 0.813 -0.007 0.009
Financial investor FIN 0.000 0.027 0.002 0.999 -0.053 0.053
Hostile HOS -0.014 0.045 -0.311 0.756 -0.102 0.074
Pre-rumoured PRE 0.001 0.018 0.056 0.956 -0.034 0.036
Equity payment EQP -0.010 0.028 -0.351 0.726 -0.065 0.045
Mixed payment MIP -0.006 0.034 -0.176 0.860 -0.073 0.061
Stock market index SMI 0.000 0.000 -0.168 0.866 0.000 0.000
Change in GDP GDP 0.272 1.527 0.178 0.859 -2.720 3.264
Euribor EUR 0.000 0.005 -0.045 0.964 -0.010 0.009 ***
Automotive AUT 0.015 0.054 0.278 0.781 -0.091 0.121
Biotechnology BIO -0.008 0.056 -0.142 0.887 -0.118 0.102
Chemicals and materials CHE 0.000 0.043 -0.011 0.991 -0.085 0.084
Computer software COM 0.002 0.027 0.074 0.941 -0.051 0.055
Construction CON -0.005 0.033 -0.152 0.880 -0.070 0.060
Energy ENE -0.002 0.027 -0.074 0.941 -0.055 0.051
Financial services FIS -0.006 0.025 -0.245 0.807 -0.054 0.042
Industrial products IND -0.005 0.262 -0.019 0.985 -0.519 0.509
Internet INT 0.007 0.036 0.197 0.844 -0.063 0.077
Leisure LEI 0.001 0.040 0.028 0.978 -0.077 0.080
Manufacturing other MAN -0.006 0.040 -0.150 0.881 -0.085 0.073
Media MED 0.005 0.037 0.135 0.893 -0.068 0.078
Medical MDC 0.005 0.034 0.148 0.882 -0.061 0.071
Mining MIN 0.007 0.045 0.157 0.876 -0.081 0.095
Real estate REE 0.002 0.029 0.068 0.946 -0.056 0.060
Retail RET 0.001 0.037 0.027 0.978 -0.071 0.073
Services other SER -0.006 0.021 -0.283 0.777 -0.048 0.036
Telecommunications TEL -0.002 0.035 -0.057 0.955 -0.071 0.067
Transportation TRP -0.001 0.037 -0.027 0.978 -0.073 0.071 ***
E(-1) 0.001 0.023 0.044 0.965 -0.044 0.046
E(-2) 0.022 0.023 0.966 0.334 -0.023 0.067
E(-3) -0.037 0.023 -1.621 0.105 -0.082 0.008
E(-4) -0.016 0.023 -0.703 0.482 -0.061 0.029
E(-5) 0.021 0.023 0.918 0.358 -0.024 0.066
E(-6) 0.001 0.023 0.044 0.965 -0.044 0.046
E(-7) -0.043 0.023 -1.893 0.058 -0.088 0.002 *
E(-8) 0.034 0.023 1.493 0.136 -0.011 0.079
E(-9) 0.009 0.023 0.395 0.693 -0.036 0.054
E(-10) 0.023 0.023 1.010 0.313 -0.022 0.068
E(-11) 0.046 0.023 2.018 0.044 0.001 0.091 **
E(-12) 0.038 0.023 1.662 0.097 -0.007 0.083 *
E(-13) -0.033 0.023 -1.448 0.148 -0.078 0.012
E(-14) -0.023 0.023 -0.999 0.318 -0.068 0.022
E(-15) -0.003 0.023 -0.131 0.896 -0.048 0.042
E(-16) -0.014 0.023 -0.613 0.540 -0.059 0.031
E(-17) -0.005 0.023 -0.219 0.827 -0.050 0.040
E(-18) 0.014 0.023 0.613 0.540 -0.031 0.059
E(-19) -0.021 0.023 -0.926 0.354 -0.065 0.023
E(-20) 0.042 0.023 1.855 0.064 -0.002 0.086 *
Regression statistics R-Squared Adj.R-Sqr. Std.Err.Reg. N
0.017 -0.010 0.340 2082
Analysis of Variance
Source df Sum Sqrs. F P-value
Regression 51 4.015 0.639 0.985
Residual 2030 226.118
Total 2081 230.133
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6.3.2 Momentum and expected operational synergies 
The estimated autocorrelation coefficients, their estimated variances, and confidence intervals 
(two-tailed) are presented Table 8: Autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation of monthly 
premium averages. On a significance level of 5%, autocorrelation coefficients of order 1, 2, 4, 
and 5 are statistically significant. It is noteworthy that although the third order coefficient is 
insignificant, excluding it would likely give rise to type II error in the model specification as 
higher-than-third order terms are still significant. Thus, I include all lagged terms from the first 
up to the fifth order in the model. 
 
Table 8: Autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation of monthly premium averages 
Table presents the estimated autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation coefficients for monthly takeover premiums in the data 
sample. The data sample consists of 2,082 European public corporate acquisitions announced between Jan 2006 and Sep 2015, 
and recorded by Oct 2015 in Mergermarket database. The data is extracted from Mergermarket, S&P Capital IQ and Quandl 
databases. Takeover premiums are defined as the relative difference between the offer price and the target company’s latest 
closing market value prior to the deal announcement. 
 
 
Based on the observed significance levels of the plotted autocorrelation coefficients, I estimate 
an ARMA model with the first five lagged terms included. The formal specification of the 
(pooled) ARMA(5,5) model is as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑡 = 𝜇 +∑𝜙𝑖𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑡−𝑖
5
𝑖=1
+∑𝜃𝑗𝜀𝑡−𝑗
5
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑡 
= 𝜇 + 𝜙1𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝜙2𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑡−2 +⋯+ 𝜙5𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑡−5 + 𝜃1𝜀𝑡−1 + 𝜃2𝜀𝑡−2 +⋯+ 𝜃5𝜀𝑡−5 + 𝜀𝑡 
(8) 
#
Auto-
correlation
Partial 
correlation AC PAC Var(AC) t-Stat. P-value Lower95% Upper95% Significance
1 0.228 0.228 0.009 2.357 0.018 -0.190 0.190 **
2 0.339 0.303 0.011 3.189 0.001 -0.208 0.208 ***
3 0.155 0.037 0.012 1.432 0.152 -0.212 0.212
4 0.256 0.144 0.013 2.261 0.024 -0.222 0.222 **
5 0.238 0.147 0.014 2.027 0.043 -0.230 0.230 **
6 0.104 -0.075 0.014 0.880 0.379 -0.232 0.232
7 0.205 0.095 0.015 1.692 0.091 -0.237 0.237 *
8 0.051 -0.054 0.015 0.420 0.674 -0.238 0.238
9 0.082 -0.064 0.015 0.673 0.501 -0.239 0.239
10 0.072 0.045 0.015 0.589 0.556 -0.239 0.239
11 0.033 -0.040 0.015 0.270 0.787 -0.240 0.240
12 0.116 0.070 0.015 0.942 0.346 -0.241 0.241
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The regression statistics for the estimated pooled model (8) are presented in Table 9: Estimated 
ARMA(5,5) model for pooled monthly premium averages. The (unrestricted) ARMA(5,5) model 
used in testing the parameter stability comes in two parts as follows: 
 
a) 
𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑎,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑎 +∑𝜙𝑖,𝑎𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑎,𝑡−𝑖
5
𝑖=1
+∑𝜃𝑗,𝑎𝑢𝑡−𝑗
5
𝑗=1
+ 𝑢𝑡 
 (9) 
and 
 
b) 
𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑏,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑏 +∑𝜙𝑖,𝑏𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑏,𝑡−𝑖
5
𝑖=1
+∑𝜃𝑗,𝑏𝑣𝑡−𝑗
5
𝑗=1
+ 𝑣𝑡 
(10) 
, where 
𝑎, 𝑏 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝑋𝑆 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑋𝑆 = 0, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑦 
 
In the estimated pooled model (8), all autoregressive coefficients from the first up to the fifth 
order lag are highly statistically significant while moving average terms are individually 
insignificant. 
 
Table 9: Estimated ARMA(5,5) model for pooled monthly premium averages 
Table presents regression statistics for estimated ARMA(5,5) model for monthly takeover premiums. 𝜙(𝑟) and 𝜃(𝑟) note for 
r:th order autoregressive and moving average terms, respectively. The data sample consists of 2,082 European public corporate 
acquisitions announced between Jan 2006 and Sep 2015, and recorded by Oct 2015 in Mergermarket database. The data is 
extracted from Mergermarket, S&P Capital IQ and Quandl databases. Takeover premiums are defined as the relative difference 
between the offer price and the target company’s latest closing market value prior to the deal announcement. 
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F-test results for the Chow’s test for parameter stability between the two models, i.e. with and 
without expected operational synergies, are presented in Table 10: Results for Chow's test for 
parameter stability between ARMA(5,5) models with and without expected operational 
synergies. The F-statistic 0.427 (degrees of freedom: 12, 212) is statistically insignificant. It is 
therefore concluded that the coefficients for the autoregressive and moving average terms do 
not significantly differ between the models. 
 
Table 10: Results for Chow's test for parameter stability between ARMA(5,5) models 
with and without expected operational synergies 
Table presents results for Chow’s test for parameter stability between two estimated ARMA(5,5) models for monthly premium 
averages, with and without expected operational synergies. The data sample consists of 2,082 European public corporate 
acquisitions announced between Jan 2006 and Sep 2015, and recorded by Oct 2015 in Mergermarket database. The data is 
extracted from Mergermarket, S&P Capital IQ and Quandl databases. Takeover premiums are defined as the relative difference 
between the offer price and the target company’s latest closing market value prior to the deal announcement. 
 
 
Results for the Z-tests for differences in individual estimated coefficients between the two 
models are presented in Table 11: Results for Z-tests for differences in individual coefficients 
between ARMA(5,5) models with and without expected operational synergies. None of the 
Variable Coefficient Std.Err. t-Stat. P-value Lower95% Upper95% Significance
Constant 0.262 0.026 10.129 0.000 0.211 0.313 ***
ϕ(1) 0.998 0.224 4.448 0.000 0.558 1.438 ***
ϕ(2) 0.861 0.109 7.909 0.000 0.648 1.074 ***
ϕ(3) -0.737 0.218 -3.372 0.001 -1.165 -0.308 ***
ϕ(4) -0.969 0.110 -8.820 0.000 -1.185 -0.754 ***
ϕ(5) 0.759 0.172 4.400 0.000 0.421 1.097 ***
θ(1) -0.857 169.679 -0.005 0.996 -333.421 331.707
θ(2) -0.757 66.317 -0.011 0.991 -130.736 129.222
θ(3) 0.395 200.550 0.002 0.998 -392.677 393.466
θ(4) 1.128 328.109 0.003 0.997 -641.953 644.209
θ(5) -0.664 281.168 -0.002 0.998 -551.743 550.415
σ^2 0.007 0.697 0.011 0.991 -1.360 1.375
Regression statistics R-Squared Adj.R-Sqr. Std.Err.Reg. N
0.280 0.205 0.091 118
Analysis of Variance
Source df Sum Sqrs. F P-value
Regression 11 0.343 3.739 0.000
Residual 106 0.885
Total 117 1.228
F-statistic 0.427 P-value, F(12,212) 0.952
Log likelihood ratio 13.627 P-value, Chi-Square(12) 0.325
Wald statistic 49.454 P-value, Chi-Square(12) 0.000
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autoregressive or moving average term coefficients significantly differ between the models on 
a 5% significance level. This is result is consistent with that of the Chow’s test presented above.  
 
Table 11: Results for Z-tests for differences in individual coefficients between 
ARMA(5,5) models with and without expected operational synergies 
Table presents results for Z-tests for individual coefficients between two estimated ARMA(5,5) models for monthly premium 
averages, with and without expected operational synergies. 𝜙(𝑟) and 𝜃(𝑟) note for r:th order autoregressive and moving 
average terms, respectively. The data sample consists of 2,082 European public corporate acquisitions announced between Jan 
2006 and Sep 2015, and recorded by Oct 2015 in Mergermarket database. The data is extracted from Mergermarket, S&P 
Capital IQ and Quandl databases. Takeover premiums are defined as the relative difference between the offer price and the 
target company’s latest closing market value prior to the deal announcement. 
 
 
6.3.3 Discussion: Momentum 
Given the results of the Breusch-Godfrey test for 20th order autocorrelation, I fail to reject 
hypothesis H3.1, and conclude that the level of takeover premiums is significantly 
autocorrelated. This result is consistent with those of Simonyan (2014). 
Significant differences between the two subgroups, with and without expected operational 
synergies, are not identified with the Chow’s test for parameter stability. Similarly, Z-tests for 
differences between individual coefficients show no significant variation between the two 
groups. Therefore, I also fail to reject hypothesis H3.2, and conclude that the autocorrelative 
behavior of the takeover premiums is independent on the existence of expected operational 
synergies.  
While Rosen (2006) proposes that the autocorrelation in takeover premiums is steered by an 
underlying momentum in the expected synergies, the results of this paper do not display such 
causality. On the contrary, I find that the existence of expected operational synergies does not 
Variable Z P-value Lower95% Upper95% Significance
Constant 0.289 0.772 -1.960 1.960
ϕ(1) -0.387 0.699 -1.960 1.960
ϕ(2) 0.065 0.948 -1.960 1.960
ϕ(3) 1.361 0.174 -1.960 1.960
ϕ(4) 1.294 0.196 -1.960 1.960
ϕ(5) -0.367 0.714 -1.960 1.960
θ(1) 0.540 0.589 -1.960 1.960
θ(2) 0.175 0.861 -1.960 1.960
θ(3) -1.334 0.182 -1.960 1.960
θ(4) -0.996 0.319 -1.960 1.960
θ(5) 0.655 0.513 -1.960 1.960
σ^2 -3.580 0.000 -1.960 1.960 ***
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affect the time-series behavior of the takeover premiums. Therefore, other factors than the 
variation in expected synergies appear to be the root cause for momentum.  
An alternative explanation, laid out by e.g. Gorton et al. (2005), is that mergers and acquisitions 
are driven by managerial motives. If a decision to bid for another company is triggered by 
managerial objectives, it is possible that acquisition quality is generally poorer during merger 
waves. However, while the volume of mergers and acquisitions is generally inflated during a 
strong market sentiment (see e.g. Goble and White, 1993; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Harford, 
2005; and Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005), market booms do not appear to engender higher 
premiums. In fact, Simonyan (2014) finds that premiums are significantly higher during times 
of investor pessimism, which does not support Gorton’s et al. (2005) explanation for the 
momentum in takeover premiums. 
Given the above discussion, I propose a theory that the autocorrelation in takeover premiums 
is caused by valuation benchmarking, rather than varying expected synergies or general market 
conditions. In other words, when acquiring companies, together with their associated advisors, 
are evaluating potential targets, the target value is, to some extent, drawn from valuation 
multiples of recent transactions. While Bikhchandani (1992) describes this process as collecting 
information about the profitability of the recent transactions, it is also possible that 
benchmarking is used merely to satisfy the selling company shareholders that the bid price is 
comparably attractive. Consequently, benchmarking in valuation processes establishes 
temporal market conventions for the “correct” level of premium. Idiosyncratic characteristics 
of the individual transactions, either positive or negative, then propel this conventional level 
upwards or downwards, as if by random. Thereby, in the long run, the series of takeover 
premiums paid at different points in time can be expressed as an autoregressive process with a 
random error term. 
For the reader reference, monthly and quarterly averages of takeover premiums in the two 
subsamples as well as in the pooled model are plotted in Figure 1: Time-series of monthly 
premium averages and Figure 2: Time-series of quarterly premium averages, respectively. The 
figures highlight the observation that takeover premiums with and without expected operational 
synergies deviate mostly in terms of variance (as a consequence of different sample sizes) but 
otherwise do not visibly differ in their time-behavior. 
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Figure 1: Time-series of monthly premium averages 
Figure presents monthly takeover premiums averages for all transactions (pooled) as well as two subgroups, with and without 
expected operational synergies, noted with EXS=1 and EXS=0, respectively. The data sample consists of 2,082 European 
public corporate acquisitions announced between Jan 2006 and Sep 2015, and recorded by Oct 2015 in Mergermarket database. 
The data is extracted from Mergermarket, S&P Capital IQ and Quandl databases. Takeover premiums are defined as the relative 
difference between the offer price and the target company’s latest closing market value prior to the deal announcement. 
 
 
Figure 2: Time-series of quarterly premium averages 
Figure presents quarterly takeover premiums averages for all transactions (pooled) as well as two subgroups, with and without 
expected operational synergies, noted with EXS=1 and EXS=0, respectively. The data sample consists of 2,082 European 
public corporate acquisitions announced between Jan 2006 and Sep 2015, and recorded by Oct 2015 in Mergermarket database. 
The data is extracted from Mergermarket, S&P Capital IQ and Quandl databases. Takeover premiums are defined as the relative 
difference between the offer price and the target company’s latest closing market value prior to the deal announcement. 
 
 
7 Robustness tests 
 
This section tests the validity of classical linear regression model (CLRM) assumptions to 
sound the robustness of the results presented above. Specifically, I test for homoscedasticity, 
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linearity of the variable relationships and normality of the estimated residuals for the simple 
regression model (1) as well as model (2) including the industry binaries. 
 
7.1 Homoscedasticity 
To test for potential heteroscedasticity in the linear regression models, I run White’s tests for 
regression models (1) and (2). Due to the high number of regressors and a possible collinearity 
issue, however, I exclude the cross-terms from the White’s test regression. The formal 
specification of the estimated test regressions for models (1) and (2), respectively, are as 
follows: 
 
𝜀?̂?,𝑖
2 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑆𝑖 +∑𝛽𝑗𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝑖
12
𝑗=2
+ 𝛽13𝐸𝑋𝑆𝑖
2
+∑𝛽𝑗+12𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝑖
2
12
𝑗=2
+ 𝑢𝑖 
(11) 
and 
 
𝜀?̂?,𝑖
2 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑆𝑖 +∑𝛽𝑗𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝑖
12
𝑗=2
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑘,𝑖
31
𝑘=13
+ 𝛽32𝐸𝑋𝑆𝑖
2 +∑𝛽𝑗+31𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝑖
2
12
𝑗=2
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘+31𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑘,𝑖
2
31
𝑘=13
+ 𝑣𝑖 
(12) 
 
, where  
𝜀?̂?, 𝜀?̂? 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠 (1) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (2), 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑦 
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Under null hypothesis, the test statistics follow the χ2 distribution (with degrees of freedom 
equals to the number of regressors excluding the constant term), and is calculated as follows. 
 
𝑇𝑆 = 𝑇𝑅2 ~ χ2(𝑘) 
 
, where 
𝑇 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
𝑅2 = 𝑅 − 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 (11) and (12) 
𝑘 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 (11) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (12), 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
 
Results for test regressions for model (1) and (2) are presented in Table 12: Results for test 
regression of White's test for heteroscedasticity in model (1) and Table 13: Results for test 
regression of White's test for heteroscedasticity in model (2), respectively. According to the 
results, model specification (1) is homoscedastic with a test statistic of 17.551 (degrees of 
freedom 12) and a p-value of 0.130. Nonetheless, model (2) exhibits statistically significant 
heteroscedasticity with a test statistic of 70.250 (degrees of freedom 31) and a corresponding 
p-value of 0.000. Thus, including the set of industry binary variables makes the model prone to 
heteroscedasticity. This, however, merely affects the coefficients’ estimated standard errors 
resulting in a heightened error type II probability. Estimated regression coefficients, 
nevertheless, are unbiased even in the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
 
Table 12: Results for test regression of White's test for heteroscedasticity in model (1) 
Table presents the results for test regression of White’s test for heteroscedasticity for model (1) explaining corporate takeover 
premiums. The data sample consists of 2,082 European public corporate acquisitions announced between Jan 2006 and Sep 
2015, and recorded by Oct 2015 in Mergermarket database. The data is extracted from Mergermarket, S&P Capital IQ and 
Quandl databases. The size of takeover premiums (TOP) is defined as the relative difference between the offer price and the 
target company’s latest closing market value prior to the deal announcement. Dummy variable Expected operational synergies 
(EXS) note for transactions where the acquirer and the target operate in the same industry sector. With regards to the control 
variables, geographical reach of the transaction is classified with a set of geographic dummies, Cross border Europe (CBE), 
and Transatlantic (TRA). Variable Log enterprise value (LEV) notes for the natural logarithm of the implied target enterprise 
value. Bidder type is categorized with a dummy variable Financial investor (FIN). Method of payment is noted with a set of 
dummy variables Equity payment (EQP), and Mixed payment (MIP). Dummy variable Hostile (HOS) notes for bids that are 
considered as hostile. Dummy variable Pre-rumored (PRE) notes for pre-rumored bids. Business cycle related variables Stock 
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market index (SMI), Change in GDP (GDP), and Euribor (EUR) note for monthly reported Eurozone stock market index, 
quarterly changes in reported Eurozone real GDP, and daily reported three-month euribor rate, respectively. 
 
 
Table 13: Results for test regression of White's test for heteroscedasticity in model (2) 
Table presents the results for test regression of White’s test for heteroscedasticity for model (1) explaining corporate takeover 
premiums. The data sample consists of 2,082 European public corporate acquisitions announced between Jan 2006 and Sep 
2015, and recorded by Oct 2015 in Mergermarket database. The data is extracted from Mergermarket, S&P Capital IQ and 
Quandl databases. The size of takeover premiums (TOP) is defined as the relative difference between the offer price and the 
target company’s latest closing market value prior to the deal announcement. Dummy variable Expected operational synergies 
(EXS) note for transactions where the acquirer and the target operate in the same industry sector. With regards to the control 
variables, geographical reach of the transaction is classified with a set of geographic dummies, Cross border Europe (CBE), 
and Transatlantic (TRA). Variable Log enterprise value (LEV) notes for the natural logarithm of the implied target enterprise 
value. Bidder type is categorized with a dummy variable Financial investor (FIN). Method of payment is noted with a set of 
dummy variables Equity payment (EQP), and Mixed payment (MIP). Dummy variable Hostile (HOS) notes for bids that are 
considered as hostile. Dummy variable Pre-rumored (PRE) notes for pre-rumored bids. Business cycle related variables Stock 
market index (SMI), Change in GDP (GDP), and Euribor (EUR) note for monthly reported Eurozone stock market index, 
quarterly changes in reported Eurozone real GDP, and daily reported three-month euribor rate, respectively. Target company 
industry is noted with a set of industry classification dummies, Automotive (AUT), Biotechnology (BIO), Chemicals and 
materials (CHE), Computer software (COM), Construction (CON), Energy (ENE), Financial services (FIS), Industrial products 
(IND), Internet (INT), Leisure (LEI), Manufacturing other (MAN), Media (MED), Medical (MDC), Mining (MIN), Real estate 
(REE), Retail (RET), Services other (SER), Telecommunications (TEL), and Transportation (TRP). 
Variable Coefficient Std.Err. t-Stat. P-value Lower95% Upper95% Significance
Constant 0.284 0.066 4.308 0.000 0.155 0.413 ***
Expected synergies2 EXS -0.048 0.042 -1.141 0.254 -0.131 0.034
Cross border Europe2 CBE 0.048 0.036 1.327 0.185 -0.023 0.118
Transatlantic2 TRA 0.038 0.048 0.779 0.436 -0.057 0.132
Log enterprise value2 LEV 0.000 0.001 -0.406 0.685 -0.002 0.001
Financial investor2 FIN -0.082 0.057 -1.447 0.148 -0.193 0.029
Hostile2 HOS -0.066 0.093 -0.712 0.476 -0.249 0.117
Pre-rumoured2 PRE -0.068 0.038 -1.759 0.079 -0.143 0.008 *
Equity payment2 EQP -0.022 0.058 -0.384 0.701 -0.136 0.092
Mixed payment2 MIP -0.061 0.070 -0.866 0.386 -0.199 0.077
Stock market index2 SMI 0.000 0.000 -2.374 0.018 0.000 0.000 **
Change in GDP2 GDP -1.108 187.432 -0.006 0.995 -368.469 366.253
Euribor2 EUR 0.001 0.002 0.548 0.584 -0.003 0.005
Regression statistics R-Squared Adj.R-Sqr. Std.Err.Reg. N
0.008 0.003 0.735 2080
Analysis of Variance
Source df Sum Sqrs. F P-value TR
2 P-value
Regression 12 9.508 1.466 0.130 17.551 0.130
Residual 2067 1117.340
Total 2079 1126.848
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7.2 Linearity 
Subsequently, I test the validity of the regression model specifications with regards to linearity 
of the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. The test follows 
Ramsey’s RESET procedure, whereby the estimated residuals are regressed on nonlinear 
combinations of the independent variables in addition to the original regressors. Joint 
significance of the coefficients for the nonlinear combination is tested with a standard F-test. I 
limit the test to second and third order nonlinear combinations. The formal (unrestricted) model 
specification of the auxiliary test regression for models (1) and (2) is as follows. 
 
𝜀?̂?,𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑆𝑖 +∑𝛽𝑗𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝑖
12
𝑗=2
+ 𝛾1𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖
2 + 𝛾2𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖
3 + 𝑢𝑖 
Variable Coefficient Std.Err. t-Stat. P-value Lower95% Upper95% Significance
Constant 0.271 0.069 3.932 0.000 0.136 0.407 ***
Expected synergies2 EXS -0.047 0.041 -1.155 0.248 -0.127 0.033
Cross border Europe2 CBE 0.051 0.034 1.498 0.134 -0.016 0.119
Transatlantic2 TRA 0.052 0.046 1.128 0.259 -0.039 0.143
Log enterprise value2 LEV 0.000 0.001 -0.547 0.585 -0.002 0.001
Financial investor2 FIN -0.058 0.054 -1.065 0.287 -0.165 0.049
Hostile2 HOS -0.079 0.089 -0.894 0.372 -0.253 0.094
Pre-rumoured2 PRE -0.067 0.037 -1.842 0.065 -0.139 0.004 *
Equity payment2 EQP -0.022 0.056 -0.393 0.694 -0.132 0.088
Mixed payment2 MIP -0.049 0.067 -0.731 0.465 -0.180 0.082
Stock market index2 SMI 0.000 0.000 -2.384 0.017 0.000 0.000 **
Change in GDP2 GDP -41.699 178.764 -0.233 0.816 -392.069 308.671
Euribor2 EUR 0.001 0.002 0.654 0.513 -0.003 0.005
Automotive2 AUT 0.406 0.106 3.834 0.000 0.198 0.614 ***
Biotechnology2 BIO -0.063 0.112 -0.560 0.575 -0.282 0.157
Chemicals and materials2 CHE -0.058 0.087 -0.663 0.507 -0.229 0.113
Computer software2 COM -0.009 0.054 -0.158 0.874 -0.115 0.098
Construction2 CON -0.098 0.066 -1.476 0.140 -0.227 0.032
Energy2 ENE -0.007 0.053 -0.130 0.897 -0.112 0.098
Financial services2 FIS -0.053 0.049 -1.079 0.281 -0.148 0.043
Industrial products2 IND -0.078 0.052 -1.496 0.135 -0.180 0.024
Internet2 INT -0.047 0.072 -0.655 0.513 -0.187 0.093
Leisure2 LEI 0.041 0.078 0.528 0.597 -0.112 0.195
Manufacturing other2 MAN -0.067 0.079 -0.847 0.397 -0.223 0.088
Media2 MED 0.256 0.074 3.467 0.001 0.111 0.400 ***
Medical2 MDC -0.024 0.067 -0.350 0.727 -0.155 0.108
Mining2 MIN -0.062 0.090 -0.693 0.488 -0.239 0.114
Real estate2 REE 0.140 0.058 2.392 0.017 0.025 0.254 **
Retail2 RET -0.061 0.073 -0.828 0.408 -0.205 0.083
Services other2 SER -0.007 0.042 -0.169 0.866 -0.090 0.076
Telecommunications2 TEL -0.052 0.071 -0.731 0.465 -0.190 0.087
Transportation2 TRP 0.214 0.073 2.954 0.003 0.072 0.357 ***
Regression statistics R-Squared Adj.R-Sqr. Std.Err.Reg. N
0.034 0.019 0.689 2080
Analysis of Variance
Source df Sum Sqrs. F P-value TR
2 P-value
Regression 31 34.361 2.309 0.000 70.250 0.000
Residual 2048 983.028
Total 2079 1017.389
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(13) 
and 
 
𝜀?̂?,𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑆𝑖 +∑𝛽𝑗𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝑖
12
𝑗=2
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑘,𝑖
31
𝑘=13
+ 𝛾1𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖
2
+ 𝛾2𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖
3 + 𝑣𝑖 
(14) 
 
, where 
𝜀?̂?, 𝜀?̂? 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠 (1) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (2), 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑦 
 
In the restricted regressions, coefficients for nonlinear combinations are set to zero, i.e.: 
 
𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0 
 
Results for the Ramsey’s RESET test for model (1) and (2) are presented in Table 14: Results 
for test regression of Ramsey's RESET test for prediction power of nonlinear combinations of 
explanatory variables in model (1) and Table 15: Results for test regression of Ramsey's RESET 
test for prediction power of nonlinear combinations of explanatory variables in model (2), 
respectively. With regards to model (1), the test statistic 1.668 (degrees of freedom 2, 2065) 
has a p-value of 0.189 implying that nonlinear combinations of the independent variables do 
not significantly explain the residuals. However, with model (2) the test statistic 7.612 (degrees 
of freedom 2, 2046) has a highly significant p-value of 0.001. Therefore, the relationship 
between the takeover premiums and the industry variables is not linear. As the industry 
indicators are binary variables, the nonlinearity appears to arise from the cross-terms between 
industries. Although a specification error in the model slightly reduces its prediction power, I 
ignore the issue for the fact that including the cross-terms in the model would make it 
excessively fussy, cotemporally decreasing the degrees of freedom. In addition, the adverse 
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effect of the observed nonlinearity is limited to the interpretation of individual industry variable 
coefficient estimates, while their joint impact is less affected. 
 
Table 14: Results for test regression of Ramsey's RESET test for prediction power of 
nonlinear combinations of explanatory variables in model (1) 
Table presents the results for test regression of Ramsey’s RESET test for prediction power of nonlinear combinations of 
explanatory variables model (1) explaining corporate takeover premiums. The data sample consists of 2,082 European public 
corporate acquisitions announced between Jan 2006 and Sep 2015, and recorded by Oct 2015 in Mergermarket database. The 
data is extracted from Mergermarket, S&P Capital IQ and Quandl databases. The size of takeover premiums (TOP) is defined 
as the relative difference between the offer price and the target company’s latest closing market value prior to the deal 
announcement. Dummy variable Expected operational synergies (EXS) note for transactions where the acquirer and the target 
operate in the same industry sector. With regards to the control variables, geographical reach of the transaction is classified 
with a set of geographic dummies, Cross border Europe (CBE), and Transatlantic (TRA). Variable Log enterprise value (LEV) 
notes for the natural logarithm of the implied target enterprise value. Bidder type is categorized with a dummy variable 
Financial investor (FIN). Method of payment is noted with a set of dummy variables Equity payment (EQP), and Mixed 
payment (MIP). Dummy variable Hostile (HOS) notes for bids that are considered as hostile. Dummy variable Pre-rumored 
(PRE) notes for pre-rumored bids. Business cycle related variables Stock market index (SMI), Change in GDP (GDP), and 
Euribor (EUR) note for monthly reported Eurozone stock market index, quarterly changes in reported Eurozone real GDP, and 
daily reported three-month euribor rate, respectively. 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Std.Err. t-Stat. P-value Lower95% Upper95% Significance
Constant -0.007 0.401 -0.018 0.985 -0.793 0.778
Expected synergies EXS 0.001 0.020 0.051 0.959 -0.037 0.039
Cross border Europe CBE -0.011 0.048 -0.226 0.821 -0.106 0.084
Transatlantic TRA -0.020 0.078 -0.256 0.798 -0.173 0.133
Log enterprise value LEV 0.003 0.015 0.227 0.820 -0.026 0.033
Financial investor FIN 0.006 0.043 0.148 0.882 -0.078 0.091
Hostile HOS 0.008 0.058 0.135 0.892 -0.106 0.122
Pre-rumoured PRE 0.015 0.096 0.159 0.873 -0.173 0.204
Equity payment EQP -0.001 0.027 -0.021 0.983 -0.054 0.053
Mixed payment MIP -0.003 0.033 -0.081 0.936 -0.067 0.062
Stock market index SMI 0.000 0.000 0.213 0.831 0.000 0.000
Change in GDP GDP 1.060 3.003 0.353 0.724 -4.826 6.946
Euribor EUR -0.002 0.006 -0.248 0.804 -0.013 0.010
Fitted^2 4.115 3.568 1.153 0.249 -2.879 11.108
Fitted^3 -4.077 4.814 -0.847 0.397 -13.513 5.359
Regression statistics R-Squared Adj.R-Sqr. Std.Err.Reg. N
0.070 0.064 0.341 2080
Analysis of Variance df Sum Sqrs. F P-value
Regression 14 18.114 11.105 0.000
Residual 2065 240.587
Total 2079 258.701
Omitted: Fitted^2 and Fitted^3 Value df P-value0 11.105
F-Statistic 1.668 (2, 2065) 0.189
Likelihood ratio 3.358 2 0.187
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Table 15: Results for test regression of Ramsey's RESET test for prediction power of 
nonlinear combinations of explanatory variables in model (2) 
Table presents the results for test regression of Ramsey’s RESET test for prediction power of nonlinear combinations of 
explanatory variables model (2) explaining corporate takeover premiums. The data sample consists of 2,082 European public 
corporate acquisitions announced between Jan 2006 and Sep 2015, and recorded by Oct 2015 in Mergermarket database. The 
data is extracted from Mergermarket, S&P Capital IQ and Quandl databases. The size of takeover premiums (TOP) is defined 
as the relative difference between the offer price and the target company’s latest closing market value prior to the deal 
announcement. Dummy variable Expected operational synergies (EXS) note for transactions where the acquirer and the target 
operate in the same industry sector. With regards to the control variables, geographical reach of the transaction is classified 
with a set of geographic dummies, Cross border Europe (CBE), and Transatlantic (TRA). Variable Log enterprise value (LEV) 
notes for the natural logarithm of the implied target enterprise value. Bidder type is categorized with a dummy variable 
Financial investor (FIN). Method of payment is noted with a set of dummy variables Equity payment (EQP), and Mixed 
payment (MIP). Dummy variable Hostile (HOS) notes for bids that are considered as hostile. Dummy variable Pre-rumored 
(PRE) notes for pre-rumored bids. Business cycle related variables Stock market index (SMI), Change in GDP (GDP), and 
Euribor (EUR) note for monthly reported Eurozone stock market index, quarterly changes in reported Eurozone real GDP, and 
daily reported three-month euribor rate, respectively. Target company industry is noted with a set of industry classification 
dummies, Automotive (AUT), Biotechnology (BIO), Chemicals and materials (CHE), Computer software (COM), 
Construction (CON), Energy (ENE), Financial services (FIS), Industrial products (IND), Internet (INT), Leisure (LEI), 
Manufacturing other (MAN), Media (MED), Medical (MDC), Mining (MIN), Real estate (REE), Retail (RET), Services other 
(SER), Telecommunications (TEL), and Transportation (TRP). 
 
Variable Coefficient Std.Err. t-Stat. P-value Lower95% Upper95% Significance
Constant 0.532 0.260 2.043 0.041 0.022 1.042 **
Expected synergies EXS -0.001 0.020 -0.041 0.967 -0.040 0.039
Cross border Europe CBE 0.045 0.033 1.342 0.180 -0.021 0.110
Transatlantic TRA 0.070 0.052 1.350 0.177 -0.032 0.173
Log enterprise value LEV -0.013 0.009 -1.427 0.154 -0.031 0.005
Financial investor FIN -0.030 0.031 -0.977 0.329 -0.092 0.031
Hostile HOS -0.042 0.052 -0.811 0.418 -0.145 0.060
Pre-rumoured PRE -0.111 0.062 -1.771 0.077 -0.233 0.012 *
Equity payment EQP 0.006 0.028 0.211 0.833 -0.048 0.060
Mixed payment MIP -0.001 0.033 -0.020 0.984 -0.065 0.063
Stock market index SMI 0.000 0.000 -1.493 0.135 -0.001 0.000
Change in GDP GDP -1.174 2.286 -0.514 0.608 -5.653 3.306
Euribor EUR 0.002 0.005 0.401 0.689 -0.008 0.013
Automotive AUT 0.069 0.102 0.675 0.500 -0.131 0.269
Biotechnology BIO -0.014 0.055 -0.260 0.795 -0.122 0.094
Chemicals and materials CHE -0.040 0.048 -0.836 0.403 -0.134 0.054
Computer software COM 0.006 0.027 0.218 0.828 -0.047 0.059
Construction CON -0.048 0.042 -1.152 0.249 -0.130 0.034
Energy ENE 0.009 0.026 0.345 0.730 -0.043 0.061
Financial services FIS -0.044 0.035 -1.262 0.207 -0.113 0.024
Industrial products IND -0.039 0.036 -1.069 0.285 -0.109 0.032
Internet INT 0.018 0.037 0.487 0.626 -0.054 0.090
Leisure LEI -0.048 0.047 -1.025 0.305 -0.141 0.044
Manufacturing other MAN -0.084 0.059 -1.412 0.158 -0.200 0.032
Media MED 0.047 0.059 0.805 0.421 -0.068 0.163
Medical MDC 0.001 0.033 0.041 0.968 -0.063 0.066
Mining MIN -0.033 0.047 -0.706 0.480 -0.126 0.059
Real estate REE 0.006 0.029 0.201 0.840 -0.051 0.062
Retail RET -0.054 0.045 -1.212 0.226 -0.142 0.034
Services other SER 0.005 0.021 0.227 0.820 -0.037 0.047
Telecommunications TEL -0.046 0.045 -1.020 0.308 -0.135 0.042
Transportation TRP 0.036 0.042 0.862 0.389 -0.046 0.119
Fitted^2 -1.653 2.184 -0.757 0.449 -5.932 2.627
Fitted^3 4.614 2.784 1.657 0.097 -0.842 10.069 *
Regression statistics R-Squared Adj.R-Sqr. Std.Err.Reg. N
0.095 0.080 0.338 2080
Analysis of Variance
Source df Sum Sqrs. F P-value
Regression 33 24.583 6.510 0.000
Residual 2046 234.118
Total 2079 258.701
Omitted: Fitted^2 and Fitted^3 Value df P-value10 11.105
F-Statistic 7.612 (2, 2046) 0.001
Likelihood ratio 15.419 2 0.000
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7.3 Normality 
Lastly, I analyze the distribution of the estimated residuals of models (1) and (2). As takeover 
premiums generally follow a heavily skewed distribution, together with the fact that even the 
most sophisticated regression models explaining takeover premiums tend to have relatively 
low R2 ratios, it is expected that the normality of error terms in the regression models is 
compromised. This is tested with a Jarque-Bera test, which effectively compares the skewness 
and kurtosis of the estimated residual distribution as opposed to those of the normal 
distribution. The test statistic follows χ2 distribution (with degrees of freedom of 2), and is 
calculated as follows. 
 
𝑊 = 𝑇
(
 
 
 
(
𝐸(𝜀̂3)
(𝜎2)
3
2
)
2
6
+
(
𝐸(𝜀̂4)
(𝜎2)2
− 3)
2
24
)
 
 
 
 ~ χ2(2) 
 
, where 
𝑇 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
𝐸(𝜀̂3)
(𝜎2)
3
2
= 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 
𝐸(𝜀̂4)
(𝜎2)2
= 𝑘𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 
 
Variable Coefficient Std.Err. t-Stat. P-value Lower95% Upper95% Significance
Constant 0.532 0.260 2.043 0.041 0.022 1.042 **
Expected synergies EXS -0.001 0.020 -0.041 0.967 -0.040 0.039
Cross border Europe CBE 0.045 0.033 1.342 0.180 -0.021 0.110
Transatlantic TRA 0.070 0.052 1.350 0.177 -0.032 0.173
Log enterprise value LEV -0.013 0.009 -1.427 0.154 -0.031 0.005
Financial investor FIN -0.030 0.031 -0.977 0.329 -0.092 0.031
Hostile HOS -0.042 0.052 -0.811 0.418 -0.145 0.060
Pre-rumoured PRE -0.111 0.062 -1.771 0.077 -0.233 0.012 *
Equity payment EQP 0.006 0.028 0.211 0.833 -0.048 0.060
Mixed payment MIP -0.001 0.033 -0.020 0.984 -0.065 0.063
Stock market index SMI 0.000 0.000 -1.493 0.135 -0.001 0.000
Change in GDP GDP -1.174 2.286 -0.514 0.608 -5.653 3.306
Euribor EUR 0.002 0.005 0.401 0.689 -0.008 0.013
Automotive AUT 0.069 0.102 0.675 0.500 -0.131 0.269
Biotechnology BIO -0.014 0.055 -0.260 0.795 -0.122 0.094
Chemicals and materials CHE -0.040 0.048 -0.836 0.403 -0.134 0.054
Computer software COM 0.006 0.027 0.218 0.828 -0.047 0.059
Construction CON -0.048 0.042 -1.152 0.249 -0.130 0.034
Energy ENE 0.009 0.026 0.345 0.730 -0.043 0.061
Financial services FIS -0.044 0.035 -1.262 0.207 -0.113 0.024
Industrial products IND -0.039 0.036 -1.069 0.285 -0.109 0.032
Internet INT 0.018 0.037 0.487 0.626 -0.054 0.090
Leisure LEI -0.048 0.047 -1.025 0.305 -0.141 0.044
Manufacturing other MAN -0.084 0.059 -1.412 0.158 -0.200 0.032
Media MED 0.047 0.059 0.805 0.421 -0.068 0.163
Medical MDC 0.001 0.033 0.041 0.968 -0.063 0.066
Mining MIN -0.033 0.047 -0.706 0.480 -0.126 0.059
Real estate REE 0.006 0.029 0.201 0.840 -0.051 0.062
Retail RET -0.054 0.045 -1.212 0.226 -0.142 0.034
Services other SER 0.005 0.021 0.227 0.820 -0.037 0.047
Telecommunications TEL -0.046 0.045 -1.020 0.308 -0.135 0.042
Transportation TRP 0.036 0.042 0.862 0.389 -0.046 0.119
Fitted^2 -1.653 2.184 -0.757 0.449 -5.932 2.627
Fitted^3 4.614 2.784 1.657 0.097 -0.842 10.069 *
Regression statistics R-Squared Adj.R-Sqr. Std.Err.Reg. N
0.095 0.080 0.338 2080
Analysis of Variance
Source df Sum Sqrs. F P-value
Regression 33 24.583 6.510 0.000
Residual 2046 234.118
Total 2079 258.701
Omitted: Fitted^2 and Fitted^3 Value df P-value10 11.105
F-Statistic 7.612 (2, 2046) 0.001
Likelihood ratio 15.419 2 0.000
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Residual distributions for estimated models (1) and (2) are presented in Table 16: Results for 
Jarque-Bera test for residual distribution in model (1) and Table 17: Results for Jarque-Bera 
test for residual distribution in model (2), respectively. The corresponding test statistics are 
135,571 and 119,958, both highly significant with p-values of 0.000. Therefore, residuals are 
not normally distributed, as was expected. The Jarque-Bera test statistic, however, is 
particularly sensitive for a few extreme outliers in the sample. With regards to the takeover 
premiums in the data sample used in this study, observations of higher than 100% premiums 
are relatively infrequent but much more so than what the normality assumptions would imply. 
Also, as premiums tend to show a large variation but are exclusively positive, the distribution 
is strongly skewed to the right. However, a slight nonnormality of the residuals does not 
generally affect the results considerably. In addition, most observations in the data sample are 
located relatively close to the mode of the residual distribution, with an exception of a few 
considerable outliers. Therefore, the interpretation of the estimated regression coefficients is 
not notably compromised. Consequently, further model specification adjustments are not 
introduced due to the nonnormality of estimated residuals. 
 
Table 16: Results for Jarque-Bera test for residual distribution in model (1) 
Table presents the results for Jarque-Bera test for residual distribution normality for model (1) explaining takeover premiums. 
The data sample consists of 2,082 European public corporate acquisitions announced between Jan 2006 and Sep 2015, and 
recorded by Oct 2015 in Mergermarket database. The data is extracted from Mergermarket, S&P Capital IQ and Quandl 
databases. 
 
Residual distribution
Sample statistics
N 2080
Mean 0.000
Median -0.076
Maximum 4.031
Minimum 0.441
Std.Dev. 0.340
Skewness 4.811
Kurtosis 41.363
Jarque-Bera test stat. 135572
P-value 0.000
206
1180
480
127 45 18 24
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Table 17: Results for Jarque-Bera test for residual distribution in model (2) 
Table presents the results for Jarque-Bera test for residual distribution normality for model (2) explaining takeover premiums. 
The data sample consists of 2,082 European public corporate acquisitions announced between Jan 2006 and Sep 2015, and 
recorded by Oct 2015 in Mergermarket database. The data is extracted from Mergermarket, S&P Capital IQ and Quandl 
databases. 
 
 
8 Summary and conclusions 
 
This paper studies the relationship between expected operational synergies and acquisition 
premiums paid in corporate takeovers. The analysis is threefold. Firstly, the relationship 
between premiums and expected operational synergies is studied to find out to what extent the 
two are interconnected. This is done by a simple OLS regression. 
In the second part, the analysis is extended to identify any interindustry differences in the 
abovementioned effect. The purpose of this is to sound whether the expected operational 
synergies’ role as a determinant of takeover premiums vary between different industry settings. 
This is done by regressing takeover premiums on a set of binary industry indicators (main 
effects) as well as interaction effects between industries and expected operational synergies in 
a subsequent analysis. 
Residual distribution
Sample statistics
N 2080
Mean 0.000
Median -0.067
Maximum 3.862
Minimum -0.541
Std.Dev. 0.337
Skewness 4.616
Kurtosis 39.040
Jarque-Bera test stat. 119958
P-value 0.000
6
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Thirdly, the takeover premiums’ time-behavior is studied to identify whether variations in 
expected operational synergies can explain the momentum in the premiums. On that account, 
an autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model is estimated for monthly premium averages. 
The estimated model parameters are subsequently compared between two groups, with and 
without expected operational synergies. 
The results can be summarized as follows. 
1. Takeover premiums are found to be generally independent on expected operational 
synergies when all industries are considered jointly. A positive premium is observed for 
geographically diversifying acquisitions relative to those where the acquirer and the 
target represent the same domicile. Notable determinants with negative effects on the 
premiums include a large target company size and information leakages prior to the deal 
announcement. Moreover, the premiums, measured in relative terms, are found to be 
higher during economic downturns as opposed to times of high investor optimism. 
2. Takeover premiums display significant differences between industries. The highest 
level of premiums is observed in automotive and media industries, whereas the lowest 
premiums are paid in financial services and manufacturing (other) industries. While 
expected operational synergies do not have a significant positive effect on the premiums 
in any individual industry, the synergies’ role as a determinant of premiums is found to 
significantly deviate among different industries. Due to large variation in the estimated 
coefficients for expected operational synergies for individual industries, however, a 
close-to-zero coefficient is estimated when all industries are pooled together. 
3. Takeover premiums are found to exhibit momentum. Significant autocorrelation 
coefficients are observed for up to five lagged monthly periods. The autoregressive 
behavior is not found to significantly deviate between the two subsamples, with and 
without expected operational synergies. Therefore, the momentum effect is not found 
to be driven by varying levels of expected synergy. 
Failing to observe any notable causality between takeover premiums and expected operational 
synergies challenges the way mergers and acquisitions are generally perceived. In most cases, 
the rationale for a takeover is that the two companies are worth more together than the sum of 
their separate parts. Hence, there is synergistic value to be created via merging. However, if 
empirical evidence suggests that operational synergies have in fact little to do with the paid 
acquisition premiums, hardly any rational grounds exist for acquisitions valued at considerable 
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premiums. Therefore, a vigilant investor of a potential acquirer should be on the alert for such 
acquisition announcements. A possible exception for the above are potential financial synergies 
such as tax benefits that are undisputed and well documentable prior to the deal execution. 
These results are consistent with those of Slusky and Caves (1991) and Gondhalekar et al. 
(2004) who likewise find no significant dependency between operational synergies and 
takeover premiums. However, somewhat contradictory results have been proposed by 
Lambrecht (2004) and Gupta and Gerchak (2002), although not specifically in the operational 
domain of synergies. I expect that the differences in the outcomes of these studies stems from 
the variation in methodological approaches employed by the researchers. More specifically, the 
actual concept under investigation in the line of research has been varying from operational 
cost-side synergies to revenue synergies and even financial arbitrage. Therefore, a 
recommended starting point for future studies would be to accentuate what type of synergies 
are of primary interest, and subsequently develop an appropriate measure, as opposed to 
covering all sources of possible synergistic value with a singular proxy variable, as has largely 
been the general convention in the literature to date. 
Concerning interindustry differences, it is possible that valuation processes follow different 
customs between industries with regards to how expected synergies are incorporate in the bid 
price. In this paper, I have proposed a theory that companies operating in certain industries can 
estimate the operational synergies more accurately, and therefore adjust their bids more on the 
basis of the synergy expectation. Consequently, it would be expected that expected synergies 
would affect the premiums more when the acquirer and the target company operate with 
traditional business models where the cost-savings potential via a merger is relatively easy to 
measure ex ante. While significant differences in the effect were confirmed by the data with a 
joint test, the results failed to identify any specific industries where expected operational 
synergies would be extensively incorporated in the bid prices. Interindustry differences in the 
connection between premiums and expected operational synergies are largely an undocumented 
area in the extant research, and benchmark results are therefore not available. 
The observed momentum in takeover premiums is consistent with the results of Simonyan 
(2014). With regards to the cyclical nature of premiums, while Rosen (2006) speculatively 
discusses a possible explanation that changing levels of expected synergy common to all 
transactions drive the momentum effect in premiums, the results of this study do not support 
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this view. Instead, I conclude that the time-development of takeover premiums is not dependent 
on the expected operational synergies. 
Given the above discussion, I present that differences in takeover premiums can be partly 
explained by valuation benchmarking. I.e., acquiring companies use recently paid premium 
levels as reference points to determine a comparably acceptable bid price, even in the lack of 
clear rational support for this given valuation level. Individual deal characteristics gradually 
propel this temporary market convention as if by random rather than as a consequence of 
changing levels of synergy. Thereby, takeover premiums paid in different points in time follow 
an autoregressive process where the error terms are near random, as opposed to rational 
explanations. 
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